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INTRODUCTION

Chairman Ashcroft, Ranking Member Feingold, and members of
the Subcommittee:
My name is Eric M. Freedman, and I am a Professor of Law at
Hofstra University School of Law in Hempstead, New York.
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Following my graduation from the Phillips Exeter Academy, Yale
College and Yale Law School, I practiced law for seven years with the
New York and Washington offices of a major New York City law firm,
and clerked for Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. I am currently completing my term as
Chair of the Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York.
Since joining the Hofstra faculty in the fall of 1988, I have been
awarded the University's Stessin Prize for Outstanding Scholarship for
my article Why ConstitutionalLawyers and HistoriansShould Take a
Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitutionfrom the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation,
60 TENN. L. REV. 783 (1993), and been named the University Distinguished Faculty Lecturer to deliver a lecture on the question that brings
me here today.
As this summary may suggest, I have two primary academic specialties. One embraces constitutional law, particularly with respect to
civil liberties issues, and constitutional history, with an emphasis on the
Revolutionary and early national periods. The other is litigationcentered, and includes civil and criminal procedure and strategy.
Today's subject, whether a sitting President may be indicted, is one
that I have addressed in print over many years, dating back to the Nixon
Administration. In particular, I am the author of The Law as King and
the King as Law: Is a PresidentImmune from Criminal Prosecution
Before Impeachment?' which I believe remains the most complete and
thoroughly-documented scholarly study of the issue. Since it contains a
good deal of additional legal and historical data backing up the principal
points I will be making, I hope you will read it in full (or at least refer to
its voluminous footnotes in the event that you seek more support for any
of my statements).
But as the basis for our discussion here today, I would like to begin, in Part I, by presenting a condensed and updated overview of my
position, taking the opportunity to respond to a few objections to it that
have been made since the Hastings article was published. Then I will
turn, in Part II, to the ways in which I believe Congress might constructively play a role in this area. Finally, I have annexed to my testimony
as Appendices several primary source documents that are not widely

1. Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a PresidentImmune from
CriminalProsecutionBefore Impeachment?, 20 HASTIGS CONsT. L.Q. 7 (1992).
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available and that I hope will assist others who may need to grapple
with these issues in the future.
SUMMARY
PARTI
I reject the idea that the Constitution gives the President blanket
immunity from criminal prosecution as inconsistent with the history,
structure, and underlying philosophy of our government, at odds with
precedent, and unjustified by practical considerations.
Section 1 presents the history of the issue at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It demonstrates that there was explicit disagreement on our question among members of the founding generationhighlighted by disputes on and off the floor of the first Senate-and
concludes that we must base our judgment on other considerations.
Section 2 examines national historical practice since the ratification of the Constitution, and finds that high federal officeholders in all
three branches, through and including the Vice-President, have uniformly been considered subject to criminal prosecution while in office;
that the federal government routinely prosecutes state and federal officials; that states regularly prosecute their officials, including their Governors; and that, despite significant opportunities for abuses in all these
areas, no significant problems have materialized.
Section 3 considers the overall theoretical and legal framework
within which this issue of constitutional law and history should be addressed. Beginning with the framers' views on the dangers of official
abuse, this Section examines the two-fold nature of the impeachment
clause-separating issues of political suitability to hold office from
those of criminal liability for wrongdoing-and then turns to the regime
of civil but not criminal immunity that has been developed in the case of
other officeholders. It reaches three conclusions.
First, the interaction between the impeachment and the criminal
sanction is such that the effectiveness of each, and the flexibility of the
governmental system as a whole, is enhanced by having them available
simultaneously rather than sequentially. Second, holding Presidents
amenable to criminal prosecution while in office would be consistent
with the letter and spirit of the legal regime developed by the case law
regarding official immunity. Third, that result would be justified by
both the traditional understanding of the purpose of "the rule of law",
i.e. to curb the bad officeholder, and by a newer one that I propose as an
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outgrowth of recent trends in constitutional scholarship, i.e., to demonstrate the virtue of a good officeholder.
Finally, Section 4 considers and rejects, on factual and legal
grounds, a series of practical objections:
(A) the argument that indicting the President would effectively
constitute a removal from office in derogation of the constitutional exclusivity of the impeachment remedy. I observe here, among other
things, that the argument is not only incorrect legally, but rests on a series of implausible hypotheticals. Realistically, criminal prosecution is
less likely to be a removal from office than an alternative to it, and the
issue of how to imprison an unwilling President is a bogeyman;
(B) the threat that the President might be subject to frivolous
prosecutions. This argument runs headlong against the teaching of almost two centuries of national experience with the rule requiring Presidents to give testimony when called upon. But to the extent that additional protection may be needed in particular contexts, statutory
remedies can do the job;
(C) the danger that the fear of criminal liability might chill the
President from the vigorous discharge of duty, particularly in national
security areas. This argument confuses the threshold question of amenability to prosecution with the substantive contours of Presidential
criminal liability. The mere fact that the President has no blanket immunity does not necessarily mean that there may not be specific privileges (analogous to executive privilege in the evidentiary context) applicable to particular prosecutions.
PART II
It is, of course, the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, that will
eventually provide the answer to the question of whether the Constitution grants the President immunity from criminal prosecution. But Congress could take some modest legislative steps to deal with inconveniences that experience has suggested may arise.
If the President is subject to indictment, there are several statutory
ways that the dangers of abusive prosecutions might be minimized.
Further, when the independent counsel statute comes up for renewal,
Congress needs to consider an important problem left unresolved after
the Iran-Contra affair: the potential ability of the executive branch in
certain instances to emasculate independent counsel prosecutions
(whether of the President or other high-level executive branch officials)
through spurious claims of national security. Congress might also wish
to consider whether the President's vulnerability to criminal prosecution
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may provide an additional consideration supporting a legislative response to recent court rulings that narrowly define the scope of the
privilege between government attorneys and their clients.
If, on the other hand, the President does have immunity, it would
certainly be wise to provide by explicit legislation for the tolling of the
otherwise applicable statutes of limitations.
CONCLUSION

Reading the Constitution to insulate an incumbent President from
criminal liability would not only feed the imperial delusions to which
too many high officials in this century have succumbed, but would undermine the fundamental concept of the President as an ordinary citizen
temporarily exercising power delegated by We the People.

I. PART I: THE PRESIDENT HAS No CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY FROM
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Section 1.

The Founders Disagree

There is little illumination on our question to be found among the
recorded discussions on impeachment at the Philadelphia Convention,
where the major disagreement centered on the issue of the forum in
which the President's impeachment would be tried after the House had
exhibited its articles. 2
The most relevant scrap of data that can be collected from the
sources presently known is that on September 4, 1787, during a debate
on the privileges of Congress, James Madison "suggested also the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be allowed to the Executive," but this was never done. According to another delegate,
Charles Pinckney, this silence reflected a deliberate determination by
the delegates that the President, in contrast to legislators, should not

2. In that context, Governor Morris objected to trial by the Supreme Court, since it "was to
try the President after the trial of the impeachment." 2 THE RECORDs

OF THE

FEDERAL CON-

VENTlON OF 1787, at 500 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (reprinting James Madison's notes of Sept. 4,
1787). But since the objection would be equally cogent whether criminal proceedings came first or
second, this statement seems peripheral to the immunity question.
3. Id. at 503. It is perfectly possible that Madison never actually intended to have the Convention address this subject in any detail. He made his suggestion because he opposed the proposal
on the floor that each House should be the judge of its own privileges, and was seeking reasons
why the matter should not be addressed then, instead of being postponed (as in fact it was). See id.
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have any special immunity. Although no one taking notes on the Convention floor recorded such a decision, it is perfectly possible that
Pinckney's report is correct, since we have no evidence of anyone expressing a contrary view during the discussion that eventually took
place concerning legislative privileges. Moreover, James Wilson, who
had been a member of the Convention, specifically urged in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that the failure to give the President any
specific immunities meant that he had none.5 On the other hand, as the
rest of this Section demonstrates, the issue was a controverted one during the ratification debates, which would tend to make it somewhat less
likely that, if the Convention indeed discussed the point, it reached
agreement.

For, whatever may have happened in Philadelphia, there plainly
was disagreement among contemporaries outside the Convention. During the ratification debates various pamphleteers, reviewing the provisions of the proposed Constitution, reached conflicting conclusions on
our question. Some read Article I, § 3, cl. 76 as Alexander Hamilton
did,7 to mean that a party must be impeached and removed from office
before being subject to indictment.8 Others thought the text meant the
4. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 74 (1800). During a debate on the privileges of the House of
Representatives, Pinckney stated that, mindful of the abuses that had taken place in Great Britain,
the framers had intended to exclude all executive or legislative privileges except those expressly
granted. See id. at 69, 72. If this is true, it is strong evidence against the argument in favor of
Presidential immunity recently advanced by Professor Bybee of Louisiana State University, which
is built in part on the theory that there should be "a certain parity or proportionality ... between
the protection afforded members of Congress and that afforded the President." Jay S. Bybee, Who
Executes the Executioner?, 2 NExUS 53, 64 (1997). In any event, the argument is shaky at best,
since, as discussed in more detail in Section 2 below, members of Congress are subject to criminal
prosecutions in all circumstances but those directly and specifically interfering with the proper
discharge of their duties-which, as detailed in Section 4.C. infra, is essentially what the rule
should be for the President.
5. See Speech of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787),
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITrUTION 579
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("Does even the first magistrate
of the United States draw to himself a single privilege or security that does not extend to every
person throughout the United States?... Far, far other is the genius of this system.").
6. "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. See, e.g., Letter from Americanus I to the Virginia Independent Chronicle (Dec. 5,
1787), reprinted in 8 DOCUMIENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 203 ("Should he ... attempt to
pass the bounds prescribed to his power, he is liable to be impeached... and afterwards he is
subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law."); NOAH WEBSTER, AN
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precise opposite.9 Similarly, many delegates to the state ratifying conventions believed that the President could be indicted while in office,"
while numerous others held the contrary view."
EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 37 (Philadelphia
1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (Paul Leicester

Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888) ("[Aifter a judgement upon an impeachment, the offender is
liable to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular course of law.").
9. See, e.g., Teach Coxe, An American Citizen, On the Federal Government I, in INDEPENDENT GAZE-rEER (Sept. 26, 1787), reprintedin 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at
141 (arguing the President's "person is not so much protected as that of a member of the House of
Representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of
law.") (emphasis omitted); ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ADDRESSED TO THE CrZENS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND

PARTICULARLY TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND (1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 525, 530 ("Like any other individual, [the President] is liable to punishment .... Not even his person is particularly protected ....
); James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution,Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia,
NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH JOURNAL, (Mar. 5, 1788), reprintedin 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supranote 5, at 322 (stating that the President "is not exempt from a trial, if he should be guilty, or
supposed guilty, of that [treason] or any other offence"); see also Speech of James Iredell to North
Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY

THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 109 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] ("If he [the President] commits any
misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable, removable from office, and incapacitated to hold any
office of honor, trust, or profit. If he commits any crime, he is punishable by the laws of his country.... ").
10. Speeches explicitly or implicitly concluding that the President could be indicted while in
office include the following: Speech of Patrick Henry to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 5,
1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 59 (arguing that criminal processes will
be insufficient to control the President; he will prefer to conduct a coup backed by his army rather
than "being ignominiously tried and punished"); Speeches of James Iredell to North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 24 & 28, 1788), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 37,
109. Iredell stated that federal officers:
may be tried by a court of common-law.., for common law offenses, whether impeached or not ... [n]o man is better than his fellow-citizens, nor can pretend to any
superiority over the meanest man in the country. If the President does a single act by
which the people are prejudiced, he is punishable himself.... If he commits any
crime, he is punishable by the law of his country, and in capital cases may be deprived of his life.
Id.
11. See, e.g., Speech of George Mason to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14,
1788), reprintedin 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 402-03 ("Mhe commission of indictable
offences, or injuries to individuals [by members of the government] ... could be tried neither in
the state nor federal courts."). Speech of George Nicholas to the Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 10, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATE, supra note 9, at 240 ("If he [the President] deviates from his duty ... [h]e will be absolutely disqualified to hold any place of profit, honor, or
trust, and liable to further punishment if he has committed such high crimes as are punishable at
common law."); Speech of Robert Bamwell to the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan,
17, 1788), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 293 (stating that the framers have
appropriately "postponed the period at which he [the President] could be tried" so that the "fervor
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Given the elliptical nature of some of the historical evidence, and
the fact that many of the debaters knew far less about the Constitution
than we do today, if this were the only evidence of the original understanding, it might be possible to gloss over these disagreements as arising from either an imperfect comprehension of the issue by our predecessors or from our own weak grasp of the historical record. But a
review of the proceedings of the first Congress makes this position untenable, and shows that well-informed contemporaries simply disagreed
over whether or not the President should be immune from criminal
prosecution while in office.
The diary of William Maclay, a Pennsylvania member of the first
Senate, contains the following entry under the date of September 26,
1789:
When I first went into the Senate chamber this morning, the VicePresident [Adams], Elsworth, and Ames stood together, railing against
the vote of adherence in the House of Representatives on throwing out
the words "the President" in the beginning of the Federal writs. 2 I
really thought them wrong, but, as they seemed very opinionated, I did
not contradict them. This is only a part of their old system of giving
the President as far as possible every appendage of royalty13 ....
of party" has a chance to die down "and cool reflection can determine his fate"); Speech of Samuel
Johnston to North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 24, 1788), reprinted in 4 ELuOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 9, at 37 ("Men who were in very high offices could not be come at by the
ordinary course of justice," but could be impeached and "stripped of their dignity, and reduced to
the rank of their fellow-citizens, and then the courts of common law might proceed against
them.").
12. The House of Representatives had taken that position earlier the same day by a 28-22
vote, with Madison among the majority. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 951 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
Representative Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland, favored the measure:
He thought substituting the name of the President, instead of the name of the United
States, was a declaration that the sovereign authority was vested in the Executive. He
did not believe this to be the case. The United States were sovereign; they acted by an
agency, but could remove such agency without impairing their own capacity to act. He
did not fear the loss of liberty by this single mark of power; but he apprehended that an
aggregate, formed of one inconsiderable power, and another inconsiderable authority,
might, in time, lay a foundation for pretensions it would be troublesome to dispute, and
difficult to get rid of. A little prior caution was better than much future remedy.
Id.; cf.Alexander M. Bickel, The ConstitutionalTangle, NEW REPUBLIc, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14, 15
(favoring Presidential criminal immunity because in "the Presidency is embodied the continuity
and indestructibility of the state"). In light of this history, not to mention the arguments I made
against this view in Freedman, supra note 1, at 14-15, it is rather surprising to find this magazine
phrase of Professor Bickel's still being quoted uncritically by such ordinarily scholarly authors as
Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt. See Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The PresidentialPrivilege Against Prosecution,2 NEX S 11, 12 (1997). I discuss this point further in Section 4.B.3. See
infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
13. Apparently because both sides believed that a matter of high principle was at stake, the
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Ames left them, and they seemed rather to advance afterward. Said the
President, personally, was not the subject to any process whatever;
could have no action whatever brought against him; was above the
power of all judges, justices, etc. For what, said they, would you put it
in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over him
and stop the whole machine of Government? I said that, although
President, he is not above the laws. Both of them declared you could
only impeach him, and no other process whatever lay against him.
I put the case: "Suppose the President committed murder in the street.
Impeach him? But you can only remove him from office on impeachment. Why, when he is no longer President you can indict him. But in
the mean time he runs away. But I will put up another case. Suppose
he continues his murders daily, and neither House is sitting to impeach
him. Oh, the people would rise and restrain him. Very well, you will
allow the mob to do what legal justice must abstain from." Mr. Adams
said I was arguing from cases nearly impossible. There had been some
hundreds of crowned heads within these two centuries in Europe, and
there was no instance of any of them having committed murder. Very
true, in the retail way, Charles IX of France excepted. They generally
do these things on a great scale. I am, however, certainly within the
bounds of possibility, though it may be improbable. General Schuyler
joined us. "What think you, General?" said I .... "I am not a good
civilian, but I think the President a kind of sacred person." Bravo, my
'"ure divino" man! Not a word of the above is worth minuting, but it
shows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leaven many people
are.

14

Nor was this the first time the Senators had disagreed on exactly
this same point. They had done so just a few months earlier, during a
rancorous argument over whether the President enjoyed the sole power
of removing officers that he had appointed and the Senate had confirmed. Beginning from opposing premises as to the locus of national
issue proved very contentious between the two houses. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 962 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1789). It was eventually resolved by the passage of a series of temporary statutes requiring the

federal courts to follow state forms of practice. See 1 Stat. 92-93 (1789); 1 Stat. 123 (1790); 1 Stat.
191 (1791); 1 Stat. 275-76 (1792). The effect of this resolution was to hand a practical, although
theoretically reversible, victory to the House of Representatives.
14. WILLIAM MACLAY, JOURNAL OF WILIAM MACLAY 163-64 (American Classics 1965)
(1890); see also CHARLENE BANGS BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION:
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 18 (1989) (describing Maclay's diary as of
"tremendous importance" for its insights into the first Senate). The Maclay diary has been republished in a more scholarly but somewhat less readable edition in THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY
AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). This
edition makes no substantive changes in the passage quoted in the text. See id. at 168.
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sovereignty, some placing it in the President and others in the People,
the Senators had debated the existence, nature, and extent of implied
executive powers under the Constitution' s -and specifically clashed
over whether the President was immune from criminal and civil pro-

ceedings while in office."
Thus, the known evidence is not particularly obscure. It is just unhelpful if one is looking for some single "original intent." The members
of the founding generation simply disagreed on this issue, and knew full
-well that they did. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that if one had asked
any of the antagonists how future generations should resolve it, he
would have answered that they would have to reach their own conclusions on the basis of practice, precedent, the nature and underlying philosophy of our government, and concerns of policy and practicality. 7 I

accordingly turn to those considerations.
15. See generally Leonard R. Sorenson, The FederalistPapers on The Constitutionalityof
Executive Prerogative, 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 267 (1989) (tracing efforts of historians and
political scientists to understand the views of the founding generation on this issue).
16. See 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OFJOHN ADAMS 218-19 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1962)
(Adams' notes of the debate). These notes are also reproduced in THm DIARY OF WILLIAM
MACLAY AND OTHER NoTEs ON SENATE DEBATEs, supra note 14, at 445-49, together with the
notes of several other of the participants. See id. at 465-67 (Senator William Samuel Johnson of
Connecticut); id. at 483-89 (Senator William Paterson of New Jersey); id. at 499 (Senator Wingate
Paine of New Hampshire). When the issue came to a vote, on July 16, 1789, the Senate split 1010, and the matter was resolved in favor of exclusive Presidential removal power by the tiebreaking vote of Vice-President Adams. See id. at 115; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115
(1926).
17. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in 12
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 11-12 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905) ("Some men look at constitutions with a sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the are of the covenant, too sacred to be
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose
what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it .... It was very like
the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government
is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to arise from
the dead ....[Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.
As that becomes more developed. ,.and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times."); Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of
the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,
1989 DuKE L.J. 561, 563 (Framers themselves disputed many issues, but "understood they were
creating-'constituting'-a dynamic organism" and expected pragmatic resolutions); L. Kinvin
Wroth, The Constitutionand the Common Law: The OriginalIntent About the OriginalIntent, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 553, 567-68 (1988) (Framers intended their successors to use methods of
common law); William A. Aniskovich, Note, In Defense of the Framers' Intent: Civic Virtue, The
Bill of Rights, and the Framers' Science of Politics, 75 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1336, 1341 (1989)
(Framers anticipated that the unanticipated would occur, and expected later generations to resolve
issues by practical consideration of whether choices would tend "to promote or to destroy republican institutions formed to protect individual liberty"); Eric M. Freedman, Note, The UnitedStates
and the Articles of Confederation:Drifting Toward Anarchy or Inching Toward Commonwealth?,
88 YALE L.J. 142, 165 (1978) (In theory and practice, common law lawyers who created both the
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Section 2. Practice
To the extent that the history of our own unbroken practice from
the founding generation through the present furnishes a reliable guide to
what the law should be, it strongly supports the proposition that Presidential amenability to indictment is perfectly consistent with the unfettered discharge of the legitimate functions of the office. While none of
these experiences are precisely on point-that is, after all, why we are
dealing with an open question-they do offer a number of important
lessons.
A. The Federal Executive Branch
On July 11, 1804, Aaron Burr, who was then Vice-President, fatally shot Alexander Hamilton in a duel. 8 As a result, Burr was indicted
for murder both in New York 9 and in New Jersey." Amid the considerable public tumult that followed, there was never any suggestion that he
had any immunity from prosecution on these charges. On the contrary,
Burr himself initially proposed to surrender in New York, 2' although he

Articles and the Constitution "sanctioned flexible interpretation" to meet future practical problems); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 395-96 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) ("[N]o society can make a
perpetual constitution .... The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it
then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct."); Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1517 (1988) (Jefferson view represents the republican tradition,
since a constitution "cannot retain its claim to republican validity without changing in response to
historical change in the people's composition and values"); see generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (explaining that the original intent of the Eighth Amendment was that its
meaning would develop over time); Eric M. Freedman, Book Review, 48 BROOK. L. R. 391, 39699 (1982) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw (1980)); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEr
30 (1980) (Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be taken "as a
delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect rights that are not listed either in the
Fourteenth Amendment or elsewhere in the document"); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1955) (Framers of Fourteenth
Amendment intended to enact an evolving idea of equality).
18.

See MILTON LOMASK, AARON BURR: THE YEARS FROM PRINCETON TO VICE PRESIDENT

1756-1805, at 354-55 (1979); 2 MEMOIRS OF AARON BURR 309-10 (Matthew L. Davis ed., 1838)
(agreed statement of the seconds to the duelists); Letter from Doctor David Hosack to William
Coleman (Aug. 17, 1804), reprintedin id., at 314-318 (account of physician who attended Hamilton); See generally ARNOLD A. ROGOW, A FATAL FRIENDSHIP: ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND
AARONBURR(1998).
19. See 2 MEMOIRS OF AARON BURR, supranote 18, at 327-28.
20. See id. at 349.
21. See Letter from Aaron Burr to Joseph Alston (Aug. 11, 1804), reprinted in id., at 332-33
("Warrants have been issued in New-York .... I am negotiating to get an assurance from authority
that I shall be bailed, on receipt of which I shall surrender.").
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later changed his mind.2 More significantly, the charges in New Jersey
provoked a letter from eleven United States Senators to the Governor,
requesting him in polite terms to attempt to terminate the prosecution. '
The basis for this request was "to facilitate the public business by relieving the President of the Senate from the peculiar embarrassments of his
present situation, and the Senate from the distressing imputation thrown
on it, by holding up its President to the world as a common murderer,"
not any suggestion that the Vice-President had immunity.2
To be sure, an argument based upon this silence can be pushed
only so far. Perhaps, for example, the Senators thought that it would be
more politically effective to appeal to the Governor's discretion rather
than to assert an aggressive legal posture. In addition, while an acknowledgment that Burr was amenable to prosecution on the state murder charges would be inconsistent with the strong form of immunity
urged by Vice-President Agnew,' one could take the view that, while
impeachment is the exclusive remedy for "[crimes] that only the President [or Vice-President] could commit,"' office-holders are subject to
the general criminal process with respect to other charges. Under that
view, the recognition that Burr had no immunity from the state murder
charges would simply constitute an acknowledgment that killing one's
22. See Letter from Aaron Burr to Theodosia Alston (Dec. 4, 1804), reprintedin id., at 35152.
You have doubtless heard that there has subsisted for some time a contention of a
very singular nature between the states of New-York and New-Jersey ....The subject in dispute is which shall have the honour of hanging the vice-president. I have
not now the leisure to state the various pretensions of the parties, ... nor is it yet
known that the vice-president has made his election, though a paper received this
morning asserts, but without authority, that he had determined in favour of the NewYork tribunals.
Id. In fact, once his term of office had expired, Burr found it wise to travel west and avoid both
states. See Letter from Aaron Burr to Theodosia Alston (Mar. 10, 1804), reprinted in id., at 359. It
was during this trip that he conducted the activities which eventually led to his treason trial, which
is described in Section 4.B.1 infra.
23. The text of the letter, dated Nov. 24, 1804, can be found in CHARLES BIDDLE,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES BIDDLE 306-08 (1883).
24. Id. at 308. Biddle, a close friend of Burr's, see 2 MEMOIRS OF AARON BURR, supra note
18, at 325, recounts that the "letter was sent open to me to be forwarded to Governor Bloomfield."
BIDDLE, supra note 23, at 306. For a discussion of the political background to the letter and an
account of the events that followed it see 2 POLmcAL CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
AARON BURR 898-902 (Mary-Jo Kline & Joanne Wood Ryan eds., 1983).
25. See Memorandum in Support of Motion, at 2-3, 18 n.*, In re Proceedings of the Grand
Jury Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972 (D. Md. 1972) (setting out Vice-President Agnew's position that
there could be no prosecution on any charges during an incumbent's tenure in office), reprinted in
App. B, infra.
26. Edward M. Mezvinsky & Doris S. Freedman, Federal Income Tax Evasion as an Impeachable Offense, 63 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1080 (1975).
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rivals in duels is no part of the Vice-President's official duties. Finally,
the Vice-President is not as important to the governance of the country
as the President,27 so that the absence of an immunity for the former

would not conclusively foreclose it in the case of the latter.
Nonetheless, the Burr episode is highly instructive for two reasons.
First, many of the most important founders were still alive and active,
and had strong incentives to assert the existence of an immunity; but
they did not.2 Second, the entire very contentious affair did no damage
to the ability of the executive branch to conduct public business.29 Par-

ticularly in light of today's conditions,30 this fact should lend some
weight to the view that it would be perfectly possible for the President
to be indicted, and conduct a defense or be replaced for a greater or
lesser period with the Vice-President, without danger to the functioning
of the government.

27. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 12, at 15-16. The authors make this point as their complete
answer to the force of the Burr precedent. This ignores not only my own explicit statement to the
same effect, see Freedman, supra note 1, at 12 n.13 ("At least as the office is now constituted, it
seems difficult to argue that the country would suffer any irremediable loss if it had to muddle
through without a Vice President for some period of time.... It has successfully done so in the
past...."), but, more significantly, the arguments made in the text, and the indisputable fact, further discussed in Section 4.B infra, that the President has received unique deference from the
courts and has unique legal resources for self-defense. See Alexis Simendinger, Above, or Below,
the Law?, 32 NAT'LL 1870, 1870 (Aug. 8, 1998) (describing President's unique legal resources).
28. When Burr returned to Washington following the duel, he was greeted with solicitude by
two of his political adversaries, President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison.
See PHILIP VAIL, THE TURBULENT LIFE OF AARON BURR: THE GREAT AMEIcAN RASCAL 106-07
(1973); see also William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause:A Wild Card in the Constitution,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 903, 906 (1991). Apparently, this courtship was due to the desire of the Jefferson Administration to secure Burr's cooperation during the forthcoming Senate impeachment trial
of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
COURTS AND PoLTrrcs IN THE YOUNG REPUBIC 92 (1971); LOMASK, supra note 18, at 364-65.
Thus, it seems reasonable to speculate that if either of them had thought that Burr had some basis
for a claim of official immunity, they would have made the suggestion. Instead, the Administration
seems to have supported the plan of writing the letter described in the text. See LOMASK, supra
note 18, at 364.
29. In the months following the indictments, Burr engaged in his normal political and official activities, drawing bipartisan praise for the manner in which he presided over the Chase impeachment trial, see supra note 28, and for his farewell address to the Senate upon the expiration
of his term of office. There is a summary account in the historical novel GORE VIDAL, BuRR 40106 (1973). The Justice Department relied on this history in arguing that Vice-President Agnew was
subject to indictment. See Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's
Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5,
1972, at 13 (D. Md. 1973) ("[A]s the case of Aaron Burr illustrates, mere indictment standing
alone apparently does not seriously hinder full exercise of the Vice-Presidency."), reprinted in
App. C, infra.
30. See infra Section 4 (discussing the impact of 20th century technological and legal developments).
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B. The Federal Judicial and Legislative Branches
While the Aaron Burr case provides the closest historical parallel
to the situation we are discussing,3' there is also much to be learned
from looking at the history of indictments of federal judges and legislators. As a legal matter, in each case we have judicial determinations directly on point. More importantly, as a structural matter, it can be powerfully argued that the ability of judicial and legislative officeholders to
do their constitutionally-mandated jobs is impaired if a hostile executive
branch can indict them-an argument that is far weaker in the case of a
President. The Presidency is unmatched in its ability to defend its insti-

tutional prerogatives against assaults, whether launched horizontally (by
federal criminal proceedings) or vertically (by state ones). Thus, the
long history of authority rejecting judicial and legislative claims of immunity in the criminal context, even while upholding them in the civil
context, 2 significantly strengthens the case that the same rule should
apply to the President.
1. The Federal Judicial Branch
Judicial independence is important, and could easily be threatened

if the executive branch used its indictment power in a partisan way.
Nonetheless, there is an unbroken consensus that the value of punishing
crimes weighs more heavily in the balance. The country's experience to
date supports that judgment; there has been no indication that the potential for executive branch abuse has been realized, and there is every
reason to believe that a judge who had been improperly indicted would
have ample legal and political tools with which to fight back.3

31. The only other federal Cabinet-level official to be charged criminally while still in office
was Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan. He was indicted by a New York State grand jury in
September, 1984 on charges, centering on fraud in public works contracts, unconnected to his official position. He resigned in March of 1985, and eventually won a complete acquittal, see Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx: 7 Others Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1987, at Al. It apparently did not even occur to him to claim immunity. He did, however,
seek unsuccessfully to remove the charges to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). See
Application of Donovan, 601 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting adverse effect of indictment on the functioning of federal government, but rejecting removal because charges unrelated to
defendant's official conduct); see also text accompanying note 167, infra.
32. This existing legal regime is discussed in Section 3 below,
33. Thus, for example, after the indictments of Judges Hastings and Collins described below,
senior members of the House of Representatives announced their intention to hold hearings into
whether the Justice Department was inappropriately targeting black public officials for prosecution. See Steve France, Selective Prosecution: Critics See Racism Behind Indictment of Federal
Judge, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 22; see also Sharon Donovan, Friends Race to the Side of a Jurist,
NAT'LL.J., July 8, 1991, at 8 (noting that Judge Collins was defended by two pro bono law firms,
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The indictment of sitting judges was accepted as proper both before the adoption of the Constitution and in the decades following its

ratification.35 The best-known example dates from 1796, when a group
of inhabitants of the Northwest Territory petitioned the House of Repre-

sentatives to take some action against George Turner, a judge of the
territorial Supreme Court said to be abusing the power of his office. The
House referred the matter to the Attorney General, Charles Lee, who
replied four days later with a short letter. Apparently considering it an
established fact, he stated without argument: "A judge may be prosecuted.., for official misdemeanors or crimes.., before an ordinary
court, or by impeachment before the Senate of the United States. 36 Because of the logistical difficulties of trying an impeachment 1,500 miles
away from the territory in question, he continued, "the Attorney General
is of opinion that it will be more advisable ...that the prosecution
should not be carried on by impeachment, but.., before the supreme
court of that Territory, which is competent to the trial."'37 After receiving
this report, the House committee considering the matter reported to the

full House its "opinion that the mode of prosecution recommended by
the Attorney General will afford Judge Turner a fair opportunity of defending himself against said charges.... and, for the reasons given in
and that an offshoot of the National Bar Association raised funds for the defense). As also described below, Judge Aguilar, who remained on the bench while litigation proceeded, successfully
pursued legal remedies after his conviction. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., CRIMNAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA xxii (Peter Charles Hoffer &
William B. Scott eds., 1984) ("At the February 1723 sessions, Justice John Tarpley stepped down
from the bench to bond himself for his good behavior after the grand jury had presented him for
swearing. Other justices paid fines for failures to repair bridges and roads and for disturbing the
peace."); PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HuLL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 8183 (1984) (Francis Hopkinson, chief judge of the Pennsylvania Admiralty Court, impeached in
1780 but upper house ruled that the charges could be pursued by civil and criminal court proceedings; Virginia Assembly declined to impeach John Price Posey, justice of the peace, in 1783,
whereupon he was criminally prosecuted and convicted); see also 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw, ch. 22, at 873-77 (London 1816) (describing the mode of criminal proceedings at King's Bench against magistrates for misconduct in office).
35. This seems to have been accepted as a matter of course, requiring no elaborate justification. For example, the first Congress, in Section 21 of the Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, at 117
(1790), provided penalties for judges who took bribes. See JudicialReform Act: Hearings on S.
1506 Before the Subcomn. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 85, 87
(1970) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice). Another example of the general assumption that sitting judges were liable
to criminal indictment and punishment is to be found in the argument of Luther Martin at the impeachment trial of Judge Samuel Chase. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 431-32 (1805). Martin had
been a member of the Philadelphia Convention, as had at least two of the Senators. See id. at 430.
36. 20 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 151 (Washington 1834) (H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 87) (report
dated May 9, 1796, communicated to the House on May 10, 1796).
37. Id.
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the Attorney General's report, is preferable to a prosecution by way of
impeachment., 38 Accordingly, the House took no further action; another
judge was appointed two years later.39
Although President Nixon's defenders during Watergate suggested
that the fact that Judge Turner was an Article I judge rather than an Article II judge robs this case of precedential value,4" that view seems
untenable since, under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance (itself a
constitutive document), his tenure in office was the same as that of an
Article III judge: during good behavior.4'
In any event, as defendants in modern times began to challenge the
proposition that the criminal indictment of sitting judges is permissible
under the Constitution, 42 courts unanimously endorsed it. Over the past
twenty-five years, Otto Kerner of the United States Court of Appeals
Seventh Circuit,4 3 Alcee L. Hastings of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida,44 and Eugene Henry Claiborne of

38. Id. at 157 (H.R. MISC. Doc. No. 95) (report communicated to the House on Feb. 27,
1797).
39. See JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH
CRItES AND MISDEMEANORS INTHE FEDERAL COURTS 251-52 (1962); see generally Andrew R. L.
Cayton, Land, Power,and Reputation: The CulturalDimension of Politicsin the Ohio Country, 37
WM. & MARY Q. 266 (3d ser. 1990) (describing political conflicts, centering on the judicial system, in Northwest Territory in period 1788-1803).
40. See Arthur John Keefe, Explorations in the Wonderland of Impeachment, 59 A.B.A. J.
885, 887 (1973).
41. See An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of
the river Ohio § 4 (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at XLV (1982); U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1;
see also McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 186-88 (1891) (distinguishing judges appointed during good behavior under the Northwest Ordinance and similar statutes from other territorial judges); cf. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 394 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison
that an executive officer with tenure during good behavior could be convicted of crime while in
office).
42. Until the 1970's, indicted federal judges had not questioned this principle. See United
States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709 n.7 (lth Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983)
("Judge Francis Winslow of the southern district of New York was indicted in 1929 and resigned
before trial commenced. Judge John Warren Davis of the third circuit court of appeals was indicted and stood trial twice before resigning in 1941. Neither of these men claimed that they were
immune from criminal prosecution prior to impeachment.").
43. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). The charges on which Judge
Kerner was convicted principally involved his acceptance of bribes while Governor of Illinois, but
also included making false statements to the grand jury and Internal Revenue Service investigators
after becoming a judge. See id. at 1131.
44. See United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982). The charge was that Judge
Hastings accepted a bribe to show leniency to a criminal defendant. See id. at 707. He was acquitted, but successful impeachment proceedings were later brought on the theory that he had procured
his exoneration wrongfully. See David Johnston, Hastings OustedAs U.S. Judge by Senate Vote,
N.Y. TImES, Oct. 21, 1989, at Al.
Following his removal from office, Judge Hastings returned to practice as a criminal
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the United States District Court for the District of Nevada45 were each
indicted and then claimed immunity from prosecution. In all three instances the Circuit Court rejected the claim, 46 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 47 Indeed, more recently, Judge Walter Nixon of the
United States District Court for the District of Mississippi did not even
find it worthwhile to make the assertion, 4 nor did Judge Robert F. Collins of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,49 nor did Judge Robert P. Aguilar of the United States District

defense lawyer, see Impeached Judge Feels Vindicated, N.Y. TImES, Sept. 19, 1992, at As, and
ran successfully for the House of Representatives. See State by State Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1992, at B 11.Since the Senate in removing Judge Hastings from the bench did not vote to disqualify him from further officeholding pursuant to U.S. Cont. Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, the prior impeachment
proceedings were no barrier to his occupying the seat, see Marcia Coyle, A Win Could be Hastings' Loss, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 3; see also Suit to Block ex-judge From U.S. House Fails,
Cfu. TRIB., Jan 5, 1993, at 8 (United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismisses on standing grounds a suit seeking to prevent Hastings from serving; he is sworn in the
next day, see The Swearing in of Judge Hastings to the House of Representatives, 'WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 1993, at A10), which he currently does.
45. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1984), stay denied,465 U.S. 1305
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984), on laterappeal, 765 F.2d 784 (9th
Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 781 F.2d 1325, 1327, 1334 (1985, 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120
(1986), stay denied in postconviction proceedings, 790 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) (permitting defendant to be imprisoned prior to impeachment and removal from bench), postconviction relief
denied, 870 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1989). Judge Claiborne was convicted of evading taxes after becoming ajudge.
46. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 845-49; Hastings, 681 F.2d at 709-11; Isaacs, 493 F.2d at
1141-44.
47. See Claiborne,727 F.2d at 842, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1992); Hastings,681 F.2d at
706, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1124, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
48. See United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 827 F.2d 1019
(1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988), postconviction relief denied, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1989). Judge Nixon was convicted of perjury for denying that he had used his judicial influence to
assist someone who had given him a lucrative business opportunity while he was on the bench.
Like Judge Claiborne, see supra note 45, Judge Nixon was not removed from office by impeachment until well after he had begun to serve his prison term. See Former U.S. Judge is Paroled,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1989, at AI8; see Senate Convicts U.S. Judge, Removing Him From Bench,
N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 4, 1989, at A7; Impeachment Voted; A FederalJudge Facesa Trial in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May I, 1989, at A20. Following his release, Judge Nixon was rearrested on a
charge of violating his parole by carrying a firearm. See Impeached Judge is ChargedWith Violation of His Parole,N.Y. TwIEs, Aug. 7, 1990, at A12; see also infra note 76.
49. Judge Collins was convicted of accepting bribes to influence his sentencing of a marijuana smuggler. See Henry J. Reske, Collins Guilty of Bribery, A.B.A. J. Sept. 1991, at 32; Francis
Frank Marcus, U.S. Judge is Convicted in New Orleans Bribe Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at
A13. This resulted in a prison sentence of nearly seven years. See U.S. Judge is Given Prison
Sentence, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1991, at A12. Although he did not raise an immunity defense, he
did argue unsuccessfully on appeal that heightened probable cause requirements should apply to
the executive branch's commencement of investigations into sitting federal judges. See United
States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1389, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming conviction and sen-
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Court for the Northern District of California-a particularly telling instance since the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction at length on the
merits, and none of the several opinions even considered the point worth
an allusion."
The courts' unanimous rejection of claims of judicial immunity
from criminal prosecution is soundly based 52 The cases have made
many of the points that I will be making below: that the impeachment
and indictment remedies were designed to be separate; that the considerations are similar to those involved in the indictment of sitting federal
legislators, a long-sanctioned practice; and that "whatever immunities.., the Constitution confers for the purpose of assuring the independence of the co-equal branches of government... [p]unishment for
[criminal] conduct will 53not interfere with the legitimate operations of a
branch of government.,
2. The Federal Legislative Branch
As I am sure I need hardly tell you, the amenability of sitting
Senators and Representatives to indictment is a similarly well-accepted
part of our legal order. The practice is consistent with what we know of
original intent," and has long been approved by the Supreme Court.5
tence), cert.denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
50. Judge Aguilar was convicted on charges that he abused his judicial knowledge of a
pending wiretap for the benefit of a potential criminal defendant. See Katherine Bishop, Federal
JudgeIs Given Reduced Prison Sentence in CorruptionCase, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at A14.
51. After Judge Aguilar had secured a dismissal of all charges from the Ninth Circuit, see
United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Supreme Court reversed with
respect to one of the counts and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other issues
relating to that count. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). On remand, the Ninth
Circuit held that the relevant jury instructions had been erroneous, vacated the conviction, and
remanded for a new trial. See United States v. Aguilar, 80 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996). On June 24,
1996, Judge Aguilar resigned pursuant to an arrangement under which the Justice Department
dropped the case, and he, without admitting criminal wrongdoing, issued a statement acknowledging that he had disclosed the wiretap information. See Joseph Wharton, Under Settlement, Judge
Resigns, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 36.
52. It is notable that those commentators who disagree with this conclusion and would overrule the Circuit Court rulings adverse to Judges Kerner, Claiborne, and Hastings, do not dispute
the analogy to the situation of the President. See Bybee, supra note 4, at 59 ("Whatever may be
said of the prosecutability of federal judges applies with equal force to the President and vice
versa."); see also Steven W. Gold, Note, Temporary Criminal Immunity for FederalJudges: A
ConstitutionalRequirement, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 699 (1987) (arguing that since indictment constitutes defacto removal from office, impeachment must come first).
53. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. See Speech of James Iredell to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788),
reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 125-26 (Senators "are punishable by law for
crimes and misdemeanors in their personal capacity. For instance, the members of Assembly are
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Even defendants appear to believe any claim of absolute congressional
immunity from prosecution would be untenable. 6 Indictments of sitting
federal legislators have become almost common,5 7 but the principle that
they are permissible under the Constitution has not drawn scholarly,
judicial, or political attack. 8
C. Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials9
State and local officials-including governors, legislators,6
judges,6' and others -are routinely indicted by federal prosecutors.6
not liable to impeachment, but, like other people, are amenable to the law for crimes and misdemeanors committed as individuals."); Speech of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprintedin 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 492 (Even if political considerations present a successful impeachment, Senators may be tried criminally); see
also Blondes v. State, 294 A.2d 661, 668-70 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (relying on the history of
the ratification period to reach the same construction of parallel state constitutional provisions).
55. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1979) (Representative could be
prosecuted for taking bribes to introduce private bills to assist aliens, but Speech or Debate Clause
would preclude evidence that he had actually introduced them); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 502, 528-29 (1972) (upholding bribery prosecution of former Senator against Speech or
Debate Clause challenge); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 171-72, 180 (1966)
(Representative liable to prosecution for defrauding the United States by selling his services, but
inquiry into preparation of floor speech precluded by the Speech or Debate Clause), on remand,
419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970) (affirming convictions on remaining counts); Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 446 (1908) (Representative convicted of
conspiracy to suborn perjury could be imprisoned during his term; the constitutional privilege
from arrest does not extend to criminal offenses); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 365-70
(1906) (affirming the conviction of a Senator on conflict-of-interest charges; however, conviction
could not operate to vacate his seat).
56. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 522 n.16. Congressional defendants generally argue only that
particular prosecutions (or portions thereof) run afoul of the specific textual privileges in Article I
of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl.1 ("Senators and Representatives
...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses... and for any Speech or Debate
in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."). All of the Supreme Court cases
cited suprain note 55 are examples of this pattern.
57. Freedman, supra note 1, at 30 n.80, contains a long list of examples, which could today
be made all the longer.
58. Politicians do sometimes express concern about particular prosecutions. Thus, for example, during the investigation of Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey as part of the Abscam
operation, a number of lawmakers suggested that the investigative techniques of the F.B.I. had
bordered on entrapment, see Steven V. Roberts, Senators Keep F.B.I. Conduct in Mind, N.Y.
Tumis, Mar. 5, 1982, at B2, and their promise to investigate that issue further was one of the key
inducements for the Senator's agreement to resign. See Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 Yale L.J. 1565, 1565 n.3 (1982). But there seems to be no
one in public life who takes the position that federal legislators should have immunity from criminal charges.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (remanding for further
hearings Whitewater-related case of Jim Guy Tucker, who resigned as Governor of Arkansas when
convicted of mail fraud in these proceedings, see Stephen Labaton, Clinton Partnersin Arkansas
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Deal Convictedby Jury, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at Al, and eventually pleaded guilty to additional tax and bankruptcy charges as part of a plea arrangement, see Linda Friedlieb & Joe
Stumpe, Tucker Pleads Guilty; Avoids Prison,ARK. DEmOCRAT-GAZE=r, Feb. 21, 1998, at Al);
United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, reh'g denied, 823 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 934 (1998) (upholding sealing orders entered in bribery trial of Governor Edwin Edwards
of Louisiana, tried twice while in office, resulting in a mistrial and an acquittal); United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976) affd 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 609
F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim of Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland that he should
have immunity from federal charges of influence peddling); coram nobis granted,United States v.
Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989) (vacating convictions in
light of McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)); United States v. Leche, 34 F. Supp 982
(W.D.La. 1940), affd, 118 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617, reh'g denied, 314
U.S. 712 (1941) (Richard W. Leche, former Governor of Louisiana, convicted of taking kickbacks
on state contracts); Blanton Sentencing Culminates Five Years of Controversy, U.P.I., TENN.
WIRE, Aug. 14, 1981 (former governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee sentenced to three years imprisonment on federal charges of accepting payoffs for liquor licenses; other officials were jailed for
selling parole and highway bid-rigging); see also United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 247-48
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to guilty plea entered
by Arch A. Moore to charges that he committed bribery and extortion while Governor of West
Virginia); Former West Virginia GovernorIs Sentenced to 5 Years for Graft, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
1990, at A10, col. 4 (describing case, noting that Moore had been tried and acquitted on extortion
charges while serving previous term as Governor).
60. See, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 260, 271-74 (1991) (reversing, on
statutory grounds, Hobbs Act conviction of 'West Virginia legislator Robert L. McCormick for
taking unreported campaign contributions); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 362, 366-74
(1980) (holding that in federal bribery prosecution, state legislator does not have evidentiary
privilege against prosecutorial use of official acts); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516 (11th Cir.
1992) (affirming conviction of Alabama legislator Patricia Davis for accepting bribes); United
States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction of former New York
State Senator Andrew Jenkins on charges arising from a money-laundering scheme); United States
v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 502 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming conviction of New York State Senator Israel
Ruiz for loan fraud; later developments described infra note 65); United States v. Aimone, 715
F.2d 822, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1983) (affirming RICO convictions of New Jersey State Senator William
V. Musto and numerous local officials); CarolinaInquiry Indicts 18th Lawmaker, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1991, at A24, (South Carolina State Senator Bud Long becomes 18th current or former
legislator charged with bribery and related offenses as a result of a 2-year investigation into a votebuying scheme); Elizabeth Kolbert, Indictments: Just A Part of the Albany Routine, N.Y. TiMES,
Dec. 23, 1990, at E12 (ten sitting New York legislators indicted in last five years); 3d West Virginian In CorruptionInquiry Is Punished by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1989, at A14, (following
federal probe of corruption in West Virginia Legislature, former president of state Senate, Dan
Tonkovich, sentenced for extortion; during same week, former state Senate president Larry Tucker
sentenced for taking illegal payments from gambling interests, and former state Senate majority
leader Si Boettner sentenced for income tax evasion).
61. In one recent example that drew a fair amount of attention, David Lanier, a Chancery
Court Judge in Tennessee, was convicted in federal court of criminal civil rights violations growing out of his sexual assaults on women who came to his chambers on business. See United States
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). He fled following this adverse ruling, resulting in the dismissal of
his subsequent appeals, see United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d. 945 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 1200 (1998), but was eventually recaptured and incarcerated. See Lanier's Conspiracy
Theory Doesn'tHold Up in Court, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 8, 1998, at 4B.
Another notable example was Operation Greylord, which resulted in the conviction of 15
judges and 66 lawyers and police officers in Cook County Illinois for various forms of judicial
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This is a fact of some significance, since the unequal resources of the
federal and state governments, and the frequent political tensions between their officeholders, would seem to raise the danger of unjustified
prosecutions. If realized, this threat could significantly weaken federalism. Yet real, or even perceived, abuses of federal prosecutorial power
in this field are rare, 6" and are dealt with through the normal mechanisms of politics,0 rather than through the creation of an immunity.
corruption. See e.g., United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
810 (1991) (affirming conviction of former judge Daniel P. Glecier of Cook County Circuit
Court); United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989)
(affirming conviction of James Oakey, former Cook County traffic court judge); United States v.
Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1524, 1528-29 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986)
(affirming conviction of John M. Murphy, former Cook County Circuit Court associate judge, and
defending operation against claim that it was unwarranted federal intrusion into the state system);
see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (ruling favorably on habeas corpus petition of
prisoner who had received death sentence from Judge Thomas J. Maloney, convicted of bribetaking during Operation Graylord).
But, while they often receive less national publicity, such instances are far from rare, see,
e.g., United States v. Shields, No. 94-1388, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16229 (7th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the denial of post-conviction relief to David J. Shields, former presiding judge of the
Chancery Division of Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, convicted under Hobbs Act for taking bribe to fix case); Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 112 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming sentence reduction for William C. Brennan, former justice of the New York Supreme Court, convicted
of 26 felonies related to bribe-taking), and can claim a long pedigree. See Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 340, 342 (1879) (upholding indictment of a state judge under Civil Rights Act of 1875).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming
sentence on federal drug charges imposed on Mayor Marion S. Barry of Washington, D.C.);
United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 693 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1976) (John H. Kelly, State Treasurer
of West Virginia, and Joseph F. Rykoskey, Assistant State Treasurer, pled guilty to a mail fraud
charge arising out of a bribery scheme).
63. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 n.11 (1980) ("Federal prosecutions of
state and local officials, including state legislators, using evidence of their official acts are not infrequent."). Again, the presentation here is a condensed one. Numerous other examples of such
prosecutions are cited in Freedman, supra note 1, at 33-36 nn.82-85.
64. Opponents of my position respond that, in a nuclear age, any distraction of the President
from official duties is much more important than any distraction of a state Governor. See Amar &
Kalt, supranote 12, at 12-13. Quite apart from its dismissive attitude towards our federal structure,
this argument misses the point of my analogy, which is that the fact that the system has been able
to proceed smoothly on the state level, despite the absence of immunity, suggests that there is no
need to read one into the Constitution on the national level, and that my position-which will
leave the President in the same legal position as a Governor-is sound. See infra Section 2.D.
As to the distinction suggested by Amar & Kalt that "Governors are elected separately
from other state executive officials-attorney generals, treasurers, and secretaries of state-and
thus do not embody the full executive power of their states," to the extent that this is true, it would
seem to support my viewpoint, since presumably prosecutorial authority is more subject to political abuse when held by a separately-elected official than when it remains in the ultimate control of
the chief executive, as in the federal system. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 12, at 12. Moreover,
nothing in my position negates the continued existence of prosecutorial discretion. See Freedman,
supranote 1, at 10 n.7.
65. See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, ChargeAgainst Mayor Strikes Chord in Birmingham, N.Y.
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D. State-Level Practice
Most states' constitutional provisions for impeachment closely
track the ones on the federal level.6 Laying particular stress on the different functions served by the impeachment and criminal processes, the
state courts have uniformly ruled that officers who are subject to impeachment are also subject to indictment while still in office, 7 and the
states in fact regularly bring criminal proceedings against their office-

holders."
In light of this overwhelming and salutary history, any justification

for granting the President an immunity from criminal prosecution must
rest on theoretical or practical considerations unique to that office. The
next two Sections accordingly explore those issues.
Section 3.

The Constitutional,Legal, and HistoricalStructure
Supporting The Rule of Law

The argument advanced here is consistent with the ideas of human
nature that underlie the structure of our government, and with the implications that have been drawn from those ideas in more recent years.
TIms, Jan. 20, 1992, at A12, (following a contempt citation, see infra note 90, Mayor Richard
Arington of Birmingham invites numerous local and national organizations to hearings on "'the
selective prosecution and harassment of black leadership"'; he later surrenders to United States
marshals after participating in a protest march with more than 700 of his supporters, see With 700
Supporters Rallying Round, Birmingham Mayor Goes to Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1992, at
A12, ); N.Y. TImfEs, Nov. 6, 1991, at B4 (New York State senator Israel Ruiz wins re-election despite ouster from seat in 1989 after a federal conviction, see supra note 60, for falsifying a loan
application); Sam Howe Verhovek, FacingJail, Ruiz May be Vote Winner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1989, at B I (describing the re-election campaign).
66. See Mecham v. Gordon, 751 P.2d 957, 961 (Ariz. 1988); Kinsella v. Jaekle, 475 A.2d
243, 252 (Conn. 1984).
67. See Freedman, supra note 1, at 37 n.89 (collecting cases). Thus, to take a fairly recent
example, Governor Evan Mecham of Arizona was indicted in January of 1988 by a state grand
jury for perjury and related campaign offenses, and subsequently impeached by the Arizona House
of Representatives. See Paul F. Eckstein, The Impeachment of Evan Mecham, LrrG., Spring 1990,
at 41 (describing proceedings). Perhaps mindful of the array of precedent against him, he did not
plead an immunity to the criminal charges; rather, he sought to enjoin the impeachment proceedings. See Mecham v. Gordon, 751 P.2d at 958. That effort failed, see id. at 958, 962, 963
(distinguishing purpose of impeachment and criminal proceedings), as did his subsequent effort to
obtain judicial review of alleged procedural errors in the impeachment trial which resulted in his
removal from office. See Mecham v. Arizona House of Representatives, 782 P.2d 1160, 1160-61
(1989). See generally Ingram v. Shumway, 794 P.2d 147, 152 (Ariz. 1990) (acting under a clause
textually close to that of the federal Constitution, when the Arizona Senate removed Mecham from
office, it had discretion with respect to disqualifying him from future offices; since it chose not to
do so, Mecham was entitled to run in the September, 1990 Republican gubernatorial primary).
68. The numerous examples collected in Freedman, note 1 at 38 n.90, include state criminal
prosecutions of leaders of legislative houses, attorneys general, and Governors, as well as judges
and mayors.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 27:677

As historians have long highlighted, the founding generation
shared a deep suspicion of human nature and a strong sense that any
power entrusted to a government officeholder was likely to be abused.
This outlook underlies two broad insights supporting the proposition
that there should be no criminal immunity for a sitting President.
A. The Dual Nature of the Impeachment Clause
The primary reason the impeachment clause of the Constitution"
has the structure it does is to separate the question of possible criminal
misbehavior from the issue of fitness to hold office. "One thing that the
writers of the American Constitution made clear was that no matter how
close to English precedent they wished to come, the American impeachment process was basically a political process for removal and not
an alternative to, or substitute for, criminal proceedings."7
Parliamentary impeachment in England, from its beginnings in the
mid-fourteenth century through its period of most intense use in the
seventeenth century and until its gradual withering away late in the
eighteenth century, normally involved the simultaneous removal from
office and imposition of criminal punishment.1 Specifically rejecting
the idea of a legislature playing this latter role, the framers created a
system under which the two remedies-the judicial remedy for ordinary
crimes, and the impeachment remedy for political misdeeds (which
could, of course, include crimes)-would play distinct roles in controlling the behavior of government officials.7 1 "The Framers deliberately
69. As indicated, see supra note 6, the impeachment clause provides:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 7.
70. PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONsTITUTION 108 (1978). There is a recent

full discussion of the subject in the comprehensive article, Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction
Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEo. L.. 2180, 2196-227 (1998),

which endorses my views regarding Presidential criminal immunity. See id. at 2262; see also
Speech of Samuel Johnston to North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 25, 1788), reprintedin 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 48 (contrasting impeachment and criminal sanctions; opponents of Constitution need not "be afraid that officers who commit oppressions will pass with impunity," since they are subject to both).
71. See, e.g., HOFFER & HuLL, supra note 34, at 3 ("A criminal penalty was almost always
attached to conviction. Prison, fines, along with forfeiture of lands and goods, and loss of office,
were meted out to defendants. Capital punishment was rarely ordered."). A number of the betterknown English precedents are summarized in E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion That Impeachmentfor High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a FiduciaryStandard,63 GEO. LJ. 1025, 1036-42 (1975).
72. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
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separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judgments ....
Impeachment was designed to curb behavior undermining the
President's fitness to continue governing. As Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist,its purpose is to reach those offenses "of a nature which may
with peculiar propriety be denominated political," that is, those "which
proceed from the.., abuse or violation of some public trust," rendering
the offender unworthy of continued public confidence. 74
Thus, although the Constitution speaks in terms of "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors,"7 5 it has long been settled that impeachable abuses
of power are not limited to crimes.76 For example, Congress could properly have considered Richard Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia an

impeachable offense, even if not a crime, and removed him from office
on the basis of it. The rationale would have been that a leader who
committed sustained acts of war against a neutral country without subjecting his actions to scrutiny by the people's representatives in Congress was an unworthy steward of public power.
§ 784, at 253 (Boston 1833) ("There is wisdom, and sound policy, and intrinsic justice in this
separation of the offence, ... bringing the political part under the power of the political department of the government, and retaining the [judicial] part for presentment and trial in the ordinary
forum."). See generally Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim
of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, at 8-9
(D. Md. 1973) reprintedin App. C, infra (argument on behalf of the Justice Department that the
Vice-President is not immune from indictment because different considerations govern propriety
of application of impeachment and criminal sanctions). Congressman Bob Barr has recently restated the point somewhat more tendentiously. See Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors:
The Clinton-GoreScandals and the Question ofImpeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 5 (1997).
73. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (case further discussed in note 76, infra).
74. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis omitted).
75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
76. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993) (ruling, in the case of Judge Walter L. Nixon, described at supra note 48, that "[t]he Senate alone shall have [the]
authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted," id.
at 231, rejecting the argument
of three concurring Justices that the Court should reserve power to review cases in which the Senate, without any process at all, removed an officeholder for being "a bad guy," id. at 239, 253-54);
Mecham v. Arizona House of Representatives, 782 P.2d 1160, 1161 (Ariz. 1989); Ferguson v.
Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 892 (rex. 1924); STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDmICARY, 93d CONG., 2d SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMmNT 26-27 (Comm. Print 1974); 116 CONG. REc. Hi1913-14 (daily ed. April 15, 1970)
(remarks of Rep. Gerald R. Ford on the proposed impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas);
Speech of James Iredell to North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 113-14; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUIONAL
LAW, § 4-17, at 291 (2d ed. 1988); Committee on Federal Legislation, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, The Law of PresidentialImpeachment, 29 REc. ASS'N B. CrTY N.Y. 155,
155-62 (1974).
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Criminal sanctions serve a different social purpose. The criminal
code, defined in statutes and applied by a neutral judiciary, embodies a
minimum standard of behavior that society requires of all citizens. If,
for instance, Lyndon Johnson drove drunk, he should have been convicted of drunken driving, not impeached. In this way, society would
have expressed its disapprobation of his conduct, while retaining a
leader who had done nothing to undermine his political legitimacy.
In light of their unflattering view of human nature, one of the
framers' key purposes in designing constitutional institutions was to
control the predictable misconduct of those who would hold high office.
But if the President were immune from criminal prosecution while in
office, practicalities ranging from the running of statutes of limitations"
to the possibility that the Congress might be dominated by members of
the President's political party" might often frustrate this purpose.
Hence, the soundest way to view the relationship between the impeachment and the criminal sanction is that these dual controls are available
simultaneously, rather than only sequentially.
B. The Rule of Law
1. Civil Immunity
The concept that "[t]he government of the United States [is] ...a
government of laws, and not of men,"7 also follows from the framers'
pessimistic view of human nature. The courts have been called upon to
77. For example, the general statute of limitations in the federal criminal system is five
years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994). If as few as 34 Senators shared the view that criminal tax
evasion is not an impeachable offense, see Mezvinsky & Freedman, supra note 26, at 1079-80
(despite strong evidence that Richard Nixon criminally evaded taxes, the majority of the House
impeachment committee refused to vote for the Article charging this, on the theory that impeachable offenses were confined to ones "that only the President could commit"), then, if a sitting
President has immunity, a two-term President could commit that offense during his or her first
three years in office with total impunity (unless the courts were willing to invent a new tolling
doctrine to cover this situation, or, as I suggest in Part H, infra, Congress were to act). Such an
immunity seems far broader than is defensible on any theory.
The Justice Department urged precisely this point in the Agnew prosecution, arguing
that, since a statute of limitations was due to expire in a few weeks, the Vice-President would have
permanent immunity from criminal prosecution if he could not be indicted while still in office. See
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, at 22 (D. Md. 1973),
reprintedin App. C, infra.
78. Cf. Speech of Patrick Henry to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 13, 1788), reprinted
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATEs, supra note 9, at 355 (arguing that impeachment will be an ineffectual
check if sufficient number of Senators corrupted).
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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give concrete meaning to this idea in the course of crafting rules of civil
immunity for federal and state officeholders that seek to encourage
them to discharge their duties vigorously, but to discourage abuses.
These cases have both substantive and methodological application to the
problem of Presidential criminal immunity.
Substantively, as already discussed, civil immunity for officeholders has never been coupled with criminal immunity. Indeed, the existing
legal structure for control of virtually all federal and state policymaking officers combines broad civil immunity with no criminal immunity.8t
Methodologically, the lesson of the civil immunity cases is their
highly pragmatic approach to the issue, which attempts on a case-bycase basis to determine the effect of immunity on the actual functioning
of the office in light of the policy objectives of the underlying enactment."' This is the "functional" method of determining
the existence and
82
contours of official immunity from civil lawsuits.
80. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) ("This Court has never suggested that
the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain government officials also place
them beyond the reach of the criminal law."), quoted with approval in Mesa v. California, 489
U.S. 121, 133 (1989); see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372 (1980) ("[T]he cases in
this Court which have recognized an immunity from civil suit for state officials have presumed the
existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining factor on the conduct of state officials."),
cited with approval in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 & n.37 (1982) (asserting that the
President is impliedly immune from civil damages actions, which implicate "a lesser public interest.., than, for example.... criminal prosecutions").
81. A few of the most prominent results of cases taking this approach have been:
State judges enjoy immunity from paying damages for the issuance or non-issuance (as
distinguished from the enforcement) of rules, see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
446 U.S. 719, 734, 738 (1980), and for judicial rulings, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12
(1991) (per curiam), unless made in the "'clear absence of all jurisdiction,"' Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1872)). However, except to the extent exempted by section 309 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, they are subject to injunctive relief and the payment of attorneys fees
in those cases, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984), and do not have absolute immunity from actions arising out of personnel decisions, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230
(1988).
State prosecutors are absolutely immune for initiating prosecutions, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and for participating in probable cause hearings, see Bums v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-92 (1991), but have only qualified immunity for advice given to the police. See id. at 496.
State governors enjoy a qualified immunity that depends on an examination of the totality of the circumstances. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("[I]n varying
scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to
be based.").
State legislators have virtually complete immunity from civil damages actions when
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To apply this method, the Court has explained,
we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official
or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely
have on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Officials who seek
exemption from personal liability have the burden of showing that
such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public
policy, and the Court has recognized a category of "qualified" immunity that avoids unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional
concept of absolute immunity.3
While there has been a good deal of scholarly unhappiness (which I
share) over the assessments the Court has made with respect to particular classes of officials, the functional approach enjoys strong judicial
support, and is likely to dominate the law for the foreseeable future.
If, therefore, subjecting the President to indictment did not interfere with the proper functioning of the office (the subject of Section 4),
doing so would be fully consistent with the entire structure of existing
case law. Perhaps more critically, such an outcome would be justified
by the same insights into "the rule of law" which supported those results, as well as some newer ones.

"acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 379 (1951), and the same is true on the municipal level, see Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118
S. Ct. 966, 970 (1998).
Federal executive branch officials "performing discretionary functions, generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), unless the "special functions" of the officer "require a full
exemption from liability," Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 514, 516-17 (1978) (granting
absolute immunity to judges and prosecutors in federal administrative proceedings).
Finally, the President has no immunity from civil suits unrelated to his or her official
duties, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997), but absolute immunity from judicially
implied civil causes of action based upon conduct within the "outer perimeter" of those duties. See
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 n.27 (1982) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575
(1959)). In deciding this case, the Court applied a functional approach to determine that the President should have absolute immunity, see id. at 749-57, but specifically noted that Congress had
not spoken to the issue. See id. at 748 n.27. In light of the Court's traditional deference to Congress in this field, it seems fairly clear that the Court's discussion of the constitutional importance
of the President's office, see id. at 749, was a supportive argument for the rule it created, rather
than a ruling that the Constitution prohibited the Congressional imposition of liability.
82. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2105-08 (1997) (denying immunity to
private prison guards on grounds that policy goals that had led the Court to imply immunity in
other contexts would not be vindicated by doing so in this one).
83. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
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2. The Law as Fence and Crown
"The rule of law," a shorthand expression for the thought that officeholders should be subject to the same demands they place on others,
has two aspects. Both support the position advanced here.
The older rationale for "the rule of law"--the negative one, which
dominates the immunity cases-is that officeholders would predictably
abuse their powers and should be inhibited from misrule by the threat of
legal sanctions." In other words, the law was a fence designed to keep
the willful officeholder within safe bounds. On this view of "the rule of
law," the President should be subject to indictment so as to deter the incumbent from improper conduct.
In more modem times, scholars have also called attention to that
strand of the framers' philosophy that hoped to find in the polity a devotion to the public good which would move a citizen to take up public
office as an act of sacrifice for the benefit of the community. Analogously, legal rules may reflect not only their authors' fears of the failures to which future mortals will succumb, but also the lawmakers'
dreams for the successes that later generations will achieve.
From this perspective, subjecting the President to "the rule of law"
is not negative, but positive. Rather than degrading the office, as some
have argued, 5 the incumbent's amenability to prosecution enhances the
reputation of the Presidency and reflects the nation's hopes: a good citizen will undertake the position as a public service, rather than as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement, and will therefore glory in the known
constraint of acting lawfully. On this positive view of "the rule of
law"-one which sees it as a republican crown signifying the officeholder's virtue-the President should be subject to indictment so as to
legitimate his or her good character as a republican leader, that is, an
ordinary citizen differing from his or her peers only in being temporarily delegated to perform certain functions.
84. See Thomas A. Smith, Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretationof the
GuaranteeClause, 93 YALE L.J. 561, 567-68 (1984) (summarizing framers' views to this effect).
85. Cf. United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 156 (D.D.C. 1990) (discussed infra
notes 140-44 and accompanying text). The court there responded to the objection made in President Reagan's brief to "'the spectacle of a former President being subjected to peremptory judicial

process"' as follows:
In view of recent developments toward the establishment of democratic forms of government in many parts of the world, and the concomitant halt to the isolation and organized adulation of all-powerful leaders, foreign nations might regard the amenability of a
President of the United States to the processes of justice and to courts of law with understanding, and perhaps admiration, rather than with scorn.
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Thus, even if no prosecution ever actually took place, a recognition
that the President has no immunity would further the twin purposes underlying the "rule of law."
Section 4. Practicalities
Even many commentators who are willing to concede that my position is legally sound nevertheless reject it as simply unworkable. s6
They urge three general propositions, which will be considered in turn:
A. The Removal Objection: The indictment of the President is the
functional equivalent of a removal from office, which, under the Constitution, may only be accomplished by impeachment;
B. The Harassment Objection: If the President were subject to
criminal prosecution, numerous frivolous indictments would follow;
and
C. The Intrusiveness Objection: The President would be chilled
from the vigorous discharge of duty by the fear of potential criminal
prosecution.
A. The Removal Objection
"Obviously," wrote Alexander M. Bickel in arguing for Presidential criminal immunity, "the presidency cannot be conducted from jail,
nor can it be effectively carried on while an incumbent is defending
himself in a criminal trial."" Therefore, the argument continues, to indict or punish the President is tantamount to a removal from office.
Since this can assertedly only be accomplished by impeachment, the
proposed conclusion is that the President may not be indicted while in
office. This syllogism is vulnerable at four points.

86. Most of these concerns were canvassed some time ago in a thoughtful and scholarly
memorandum by Robert G. Dixon, Jr., a constitutional law expert who served as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, see Robert G. Dixon
Jr., Law Professor,Dies, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1980, at D4, that has only recently surfaced publicly. Written as Watergate crises loomed, the memorandum concludes on the basis of a series of

practical considerations that the President (in contrast to the Vice President) is immune from
prosecution while in office. See Memorandum re Amenability of the President, Vice President and
other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973) (on file with
the Hofstra Law Review).
87. Bickel, supra note 12, at 15.
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First, it hypothesizes a remote sequence of events, albeit one that I
have argued we should provide for: the President is facing criminal proceedings, but not impeachment proceedings. If so, the criminal charges
are likely to be relatively minor ones--drunk driving, say s -- and the
objection that one is effectively removing the President from office is
pro tanto of less force. If not, then in measuring whether the Presidency
can "be effectively carried on while an incumbent is defending himself," the true comparison is not between the disruptiveness of criminal
proceedings and no proceedings, but rather between the disruptiveness
of criminal proceedings and impeachment proceedings-which would
appear to be approximately equal.89
The removal objection also implausibly assumes thatnotwithstanding the creativity in sentencing that judges exercise daily,"
88. To take another example, it is not inconceivable that a President might do as many public figures in our society have done: admit an addiction to alcohol or cocaine, plead guilty to negotiated criminal charges, vanish for a month or so of rehabilitation in an institution, and reemerge to resume his or her prior role. As discussed below, Section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment would make such a plan easy to implement.
The basic point is that rejecting the idea of criminal immunity for the President
"provide[s] a means of regulating high-level executive misconduct that may go unregulated by the
Executive Branch, yet may never rise to the level where an impeachment proceeding would gain
sufficient congressional support." Geoffrey M. McNutt, Note, Formaland FunctionalApproaches
to Separation of Powers: The PoliticalCost of Checks and Balances in Nixon v. United States and
Morrison v. Olson, 2 GEo. MASON L. REv. 281,300 (1995).
89. Such scanty national experience as we have on this subject supports this equivalence.
Andrew Johnson did not attend his impeachment trial, but was acquitted nonetheless. Richard
Nixon never appeared in a courtroom throughout the Watergate affair, and, even when considering
fining him for contempt, the trial judge was prepared to excuse him from personal appearance. See
JOHN J. SIRICA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS,
THEPARDON 179 (1979).
The order I had drawn up required the president to appear the next morning in my
court to explain why a contempt citation should not be issued and fines not imposed.
And should he elect simply to send his lawyers, I required that he personally sign a
waiver of his right to appear.
1; cf. infra note 96 (discussing disruptive effects of Clinton impeachment).
90. The overwhelming majority of convicted criminals in this country are not sentenced to
prison, and, as cell space grows increasingly scarce relative to demand, the use of alternative sentences is increasing. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Feeling Prisons' Costs, Governors Weigh Alternatives,N.Y. Tims, Aug. 7, 1992, at A17; Andrew H. Malcolm, New Strategies to Fight Crime
Go FarBeyond Stiffer Terms and More Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A16.
Thus, no great judicial creativity would be required to impose a non-jail (or perhaps
weekend jail) sentence on a convicted President, and the tools for doing so would lie close at hand.
See, e.g., Alicia M. Grace, Note, Home Incarceration Under Electronic Monitoring: A Statutory
Review, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 285 (1990); Elizabeth Anderson, States Using Electronic
Device to Monitor Prisonersat Home, N.Y. TIMES, N.J. Weekly, May 13, 1990, at 1 ("Nationally,
experts estimate, 10,000 criminals in more than 40 states are electronically monitored" by a
bracelet device that creates "an unstructured structured environment" which can be adapted to
convicts' scheduling needs); Ronald Smothers, Birmingham Mayor Cited for Contempt, N.Y.
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and the extreme deference with which the person of the President has
always been treated by the courts in the testimonial context-a court
would impose a jail term upon conviction."
Second, even assuming all of that (but also assuming, as we must
for the objection to have any force, that the crime is not so serious as to
result in removal from office by impeachment-which suggests that the

sentence will be relatively short), it may indeed be possible to conduct
the Presidency from a jail cell. Woodrow Wilson after his stroke in
1919 and Ronald Reagan following his prostate surgery in early 1987
were both so incapacitated as to be well-nigh absent.2 But, through surrogates, the Presidency was conducted nonetheless. Additionally, developments in communications technology continue to enhance the ability
of white collar workers like the President to conduct their business from

virtually anywhere.9
Far-fetched as this may sound, experience shows that we are much
more likely to underestimate than overestimate the robustness of the
Presidency. When subpoenaed for the Burr trial, Jefferson complained
that such a precedent would make it impossible for him to discharge his
duties;94 yet the President managed to conduct a vigorous defense at the
same time as he was overseeing the military and diplomatic preparations for what seemed to be imminent wars with both Britain and the
Indian tribes of the Midwest. 5 Similarly, the crises of Watergate came
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1992, at A6 (Federal contempt citation issued against Mayor Richard Arrington,
Jr., "drawn to consider the 'right of the people of Birmingham to have their Mayor on duty,"' calls
for him to serve jail terms lasting from Thursday evenings to Monday mornings of each week he
fails to comply with document subpoena in corruption investigation).
91. Cf. Speech of James Madison to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 408 ("We must keep within the compass of human probability. If a possibility be the cause of objection, we must object to every government in
America.").
92. See KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, WOODROW WILSON: WORLD STATESMAN 216 (1987);
DONALD T. REGAN, FOR THE RECORD: FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 71 (1988); EDWIN
A. 'WEINSTEIN, WOODROW VILSON: A MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY 357-69
(1981).
93. Cf. Maureen Dowd, Aides Worry About How Bush's Vacation Looks in a Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at A8 (explaining that not wishing "'to appear to be held hostage in the
White House to events,"' President Bush went on vacation to Maine three days after sending
troops to the Persian Gulf, assuring the public that "'highly complex and highly efficient communications"' enabled him to conduct necessary business from there). See generally Spencer Reiss,
The Strongman in Stir, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1990, at 24 (describing special arrangements for General Manuel Noriega of Panama in a Miami federal prison).
94. See infra note 127-28 and accompanying text.
95. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 1, 1807), reprintedin 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 350-51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Henry Dearborn (Sept. 6, 1807), reprinted in id. at 361; Letter from Thomas Jefferson
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simultaneously with both the Agnew resignation and a Middle Eastern
war,96 with no visible adverse effect on the President's performance.
Third, even assuming that the President could not perform his or
duties effectively while defending against criminal charges or serving a
criminal sentence, the removal objection is flawed because its legal
premise-that impeachment is the exclusive means of removing a
President from office-is constitutionally inaccurate. The Twenty-Fifth

Amendment provides two mechanisms for having the President leave
office temporarily.
The simplest possibility would be for the President, invoking Section 3 of the Amendment,97 to step aside voluntarily for the duration of
the criminal proceedings. The language of Section 3 was deliberately
left broad, both to cover unexpected contingencies and to encourage the
President to relinquish his or her duties when circumstances warranted.98

For this reason, its use by a President prior to entering jail would be as
appropriate as its use prior to undergoing surgery. For instance, a popular President, arrested for relatively minor wrongdoing, might apologize
to Thomas Paine (Sept. 6, 1807), reprintedin id. at 362.
96. See 2 RICHARD NIXON, RN, THE MmOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 475-503 (1978).
The experience of President Clinton certainly supports the suggestion, see supranote 89
and accompanying text, that impeachment proceedings do at least as much damage to the President's ability to conduct foreign affairs as criminal proceedings would. On the day the House was
scheduled to vote to impeach him, President Clinton launched air strikes against Iraq, thereby setting off an intense political controversy as to whether the action had been taken in good faith or to
disrupt the impeachment process. See Francis X. Clines & Steven Lee Myers, Impeachment Vote
in House Delayed As Clinton Launches IraqAir Strike, Citing MilitaryNeed to Move Swiftly, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at Al; see also James Bennet & John M. Broder, A Long Day of Planning
and Fatigue, on 2 Fronts,id. at A29 (describing President's intertwined consideration of the two
matters). Subsequently, it was suggested that the President's decisionmaking process leading to his
determination that NATO should conduct a bombing campaign in response to Yugoslovia's actions in Kosovo had been undermined by distractions caused by his impeachment and Senate trial.
See Elaine Sciolino & Ethan Bronner, How a President,Distracted by Scandal, EnteredBalkan
War, N.Y. TIES, Apr. 18, 1999, at Al.
97. This provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
-FIFrH AMENDMENT 197 (1976) (Lack of definition
98. See JOHN D. FEERIcK, THE Tw
of inability "was not the result of an oversight. Rather, it reflected a judgment that a rigid consti); William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The
tutional definition was undesirable ....
Realities of PresidentialSuccession: "The Emperor Has No Clones", 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1405
(1987) ("Section 3 of the amendment is intended.., to encourage an incapacitated President to
step aside temporarily by assuring that resumption of the office will be possible immediately upon
recovery.").
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to the nation, serve the sentence, and return to the good graces of the

country. In fact, during Watergate, lawyers for both the White House
and the Special Prosecutor planned for the possibility of President
Nixon making use of Section 3 if he wished to step aside temporarily
while fighting legal battles. 99
Professor Bickel argued against using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in this way, urging that the Amendment should be applied only to
physical disability, because "the amendment would be a dangerous instrument indeed if it were otherwise."" But that position has little force
when applied to Section 3, which can only be triggered by the voluntary
action of the President.
The argument for a limited definition of inability is more plausible
when the discussion turns to the second option under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, a declaration by the Vice-President and the Cabinet, acting
under Section 4,11 that the President "is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office" due to the criminal proceedings. Because such
a declaration would have the effect of suspending the President from
office, if those officers thought that the President's legal difficulties
were incapacitating and the President thought otherwise, a crisis might
well ensue. But this precise problem was foreseen by the framers of the

Amendment, who did not choose to solve it by Professor Bickel's°
method of limiting the definition of "inability" to physical illness.

0

99. See BOB WOODWARD & CARLBERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 325 (1976).
100. Bickel, supranote 12, at 15.
101. This provides:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the [Congress] their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the [Congress] his written declaration that
no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or
of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days... their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue ....If the Congress ...determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
102. See FEERICK, supra note 98, at 198-99 (describing various emergencies considered in
floor debates); III PAPERS ON PRESImTIAL Dissrrm= AND THE TwENTY-FlFrH AmENDMENT 6869 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1996) (Justice Department contemplated that President might be
taken hostage); Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 98, at 1407 n.68 (sponsors considered, e.g.,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss4/3

34

Freedman: On Protecting Accountability

1999]

ONPROTECTINGACCOUNTABILITY

Rather, they deliberately made it more difficult to remove the President
through Section 4 (two-thirds vote in both Houses) than by impeachment (majority in the House, two-thirds in the Senate). In the words of
the Amendment's author and prime sponsor, "We were concerned about
the politics of the palace coup. So in reality, we created a vehicle where
it is more difficult to declare a president disabled than it is to impeach
him for a breach of his constitutional duties."' 3 Hence, any President
involuntarily removed under Section 4 would be one who in any event
lacked the votes to stave off impeachment.
History has already shown the wisdom of the framers' choice. One
serious concern during Watergate was that President Nixon might be
impeached and convicted, and yet remain in the White House, perhaps
protected by the military, and refuse to leave."° This nightmare scenario
had been envisioned by the opponents of the original Constitution,'05 but
the availability of Section 4, with its unambiguous procedures for demonstrating the overwhelming will of the country, helps reduce the likelihood of the nightmare coming true.
Section 4 could prove equally valuable if an incumbent President
were to be indicted. There could, for example, be a form of plea bargain, under which the President, rather than be impeached, agreed not to
contest a Section 4 suspension from office during the pendency of
criminal proceedings." ° But even without the President's consent, the
capture of President by enemy).
103. See PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TwENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra
note 102, at 10-11 (remarks of former Senator Birch Bayh); see also Brown & Cinquegrana, supra
note 98, at 1413-14. Senator Bayh's account of the writing and passage of the amendment is
BIRcH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY (1968).
104. See WooDwARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 214-16 (group headed by Phil Buchen,
later white House counsel, that met to plan for the Ford Presidency considered this possibility and
the potential need to remove Nixon through Section 4); William Safire, Command & Control,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1989, at A35 (corroborative account of former Secretary of Defense James
Schlessinger).
105. See Letter from Tamony to Virginia Independent Chronicle (Jan. 9, 1788), reprinted in
15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 324 (President will use the army to resist impeachment; no hope for "the bauble of a mace, hazarded in the mouth of a mortar"); LUTHER MARTIN,
THE GENUINE INFORMATION DELVERED TO THE STATE OF MARYLAND 69 (Philadelphia 1788),
reprintedin 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 219-20 (In

light of President's powers, "to him it would be of little consequence whether he was impeached or
convicted, since he will be able to set both at defiance"); cf. Speech of Patrick Henry to Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 5, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 59-60
(President will not be stopped by criminal process any more than by impeachment; he will prefer
to conduct a coup backed by army rather than "being ignominiously tried and punished.").
106. Cf.Wflliam Safire, Taking the 25th, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1985, at A19. ("Someday a
President will be faced with a debilitating physical or mental ailment, and will find tempting an
option that is short of resignation.").
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use of Section 4 to accomplish such a suspension would be perfectly
appropriate, and might under some circumstances be preferable to im-

peachment. Suppose, for example, the charges were serious but the evidence of guilt were unclear. Remitting the President to the criminal
process, from which he or she could seek to return to office at any time,
might well be more desirable, from the viewpoint of governmental efficiency and as a matter of due process, than protracted impeachment
proceedings that might effectively recreate the parliamentary practice of
criminal trials in a legislative forum.
In short, using either Section 3 or Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to remove the President from office until the resolution of

criminal charges would be not only legal, but eminently practical. This
conclusion strikes a hard blow at the argument that the President must
have immunity from criminal charges while in office because under the
Constitution he or she may only be removed from office by impeachment.
Fourth, the question of how to enforce a criminal sentence against
the President is no different than the question of how to enforce a subpoena against the President.'7 Yet, while acknowledging the potential
problems in implementing their decrees," 3 judges have regularly required Presidents to comply with testimonial demands."° The courts
have apparently believed, and with some reason, that, should push come
to shove: (1) they would be able to formulate an appropriate coercive
sanction,"0 or (2) the President would deem the political costs of resis107. Thus, for instance, in arguing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866), on behalf of
the President, Attorney General Henry Stanbery vigorously criticized the Burr subpoena case,
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va.) (No. 14,692d) (discussed infra notes 117-29 and
accompanying text), on the basis that the testimonial duty recognized there could not be enforced
without imprisoning the President, which would constitute an improper judicial removal from office. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 487. The same argument was made by the dissent in
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). But, as a result of United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (discussed infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text), the Burr rule
is now firmly established. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702.
108. See SnUCA, supra note 89, at 179 ("As I said, I had thought a few times about imposing
a jail sentence, but that was absurd .... And what would I have done to enforce the sentence?
Send the United States marshals over to confront the Secret Service?").
109. Perhaps the enforcement problem has encouraged the courts in their practice, discussed
below, of showing great deference to Presidents, but that would be true in the criminal context as
well. The courts would no doubt be mindful of the problem as they drew the contours of the President's substantive privilege.
110. See, e.g., SIrICA, supranote 89, at 179-80 (trial judge was prepared to enforce the grand
jury subpoena issued to President Nixon by a contempt citation and fines).
In a practical example of the validity of this reasoning, the trial judge in the sexual harassment case brought by Paula Corbin Jones against President Clinton held him in contempt for
testifying falsely during his deposition, see Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999),
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tance too high,"' or (3) the country would consider defiance itself to be
an impeachable offense. All of the same considerations apply to the enforcement of criminal sanctions. Certainly, a President who wished to
retain office would have strong incentives to appear to be cooperating
with, rather than defying, the criminal process.
It is in this context that one should consider the suggestion of thenSolicitor General Bork that the President must have immunity because
the power to pardon himself or herself would render any conviction nugatory."' The brief response is that, assuming the legal premise is accurate,"' this possibility is logically unconnected to the issue of whether
the officeholder has immunity while in office. If a President deemed the
legal and political risks of the pardon route worth taking in order to
achieve protection after leaving office, he 4or she could take it regardless
of how the immunity issue were decided."
But there is also a slightly longer answer. In cases where the President's crimes are also impeachable offenses, the amenability of the
President to prosecution while in office is of less importance than in
other circumstances. ' The President's lack of immunity from criminal
proceedings is most critical in situations where the crime is not impeachable, e.g. drunken driving, and prosecution serves as a mechanism
to enable society to express its disapprobation while retaining a leader
who continues to enjoy political support. Any President who pardoned
himself or herself for a crime of that sort would surely forfeit that political support, and be impeached.
Yet the President would have a strong incentive to remain in the
good graces of the country. Since the power to pardon extends only to
and sanctioned him by directing him to reimburse the Court and opposing counsel approximately
$90,000 for the costs he had thereby created. See Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 1999 WL
555622 (E.D. Ark. July 29, 1999). The President immediately responded by issuing a statement
saying, "We accept the order of the court and will comply with it." See Robert Suro, Clinton is
Sanctionedin Jones Lawsuit; Payment Ordered to Lawyers, Court, WASH. POST, July 30, 1999, at

Al.
111. This is the conclusion President Nixon reached. See infra note 136.
112. See Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, at 20 (D.
Md. 1973), reprinted in App. C, infra.
113. For a persuasive case to the contrary, see Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The ConstitutionalCase Against PresidentialSelf-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779 (1996).
114. See WooDWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 325-26 (During Watergate, President
Nixon's staff researched the issue of whether he could pardon himself, and concluded that he
could); see also Daniel Schorr, Will Bush Pardon Himself?., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1992, at A15
(describing this episode).
115. But cf. supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing practical benefits of having
both sanctions available).
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"Offences against the United States,""n6 the officeholder would remain
subject to correlative state prosecutions regardless of the self-pardon;
and whether or not those could be brought while he or she remained in
office, they could be afterwards.
These legal, political, and practical considerations all reinforce the
conclusion validated by the actual experience of President Nixon: the
self-pardon scenario does not weaken the argument against the removal
objection. Realistically, criminal prosecution is less likely to be a removal from office than an alternative to it.
B. The Harassment Objection
The view that permitting indictment of the President could unleash
a potentially debilitating swarm of frivolous prosecutions is practically,
historically, and legally unsound. It is, in addition, inconsistent with the
experience we have had, and with the legal framework we could have.
1. Historical Judicial Protection
The President receives more deference from the courts than any
other official in the country, as the cases regarding his or her amenability to give testimony show. The courts have long insisted on, and Presidents have generally accepted, a presidential duty to provide relevant
trial testimony. Yet the judiciary has enforced this duty with considerable deference to the demands of the President's office, thus protecting
the incumbent from harassment while making evidence available in appropriate cases. Any court faced with the problem of protecting the
President from an abusive criminal prosecution would approach the issue against the backdrop of this rich constitutional history.
In 1807, Aaron Burr stood trial for treason. The charges were in
substance that, following his term as Vice President, he had sought to
separate some of the country's newly-acquired western territories from
their allegiance to the United States. During the course of the proceedings, he demanded that President Jefferson produce a letter that Jefferson had received from General James Wilkinson. The basis for the request was that Jefferson had informed Congress of the letter in a
message that stated that Burr's "guilt is placed beyond question.""' 7
Chief Justice Marshall, who was presiding at the trial, distinguished the
President from the King, and ordered issuance of the subpoena. He
116. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
117. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32, 36 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); 16
ANNALS OF CONG. 39 (1807) (message to Congress of Jan. 22, 1807).
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stated that once the document had been produced, he would review it in
camera to redact any irrelevant material implicating matters of state."'
On receiving the subpoena, Jefferson wrote counsel for the government, promising to send the requested letter, and requesting that
counsel furnish the defense with the material sections. 19 Counsel accordingly tendered the defense portions of the letter while offering to
submit the entire document to the court.'2 Burr objected that this was
insufficient, 12' and Marshall delivered another opinion, this one stating
that he would not even consider permitting any redactions unless they
were personally directed by the President; Marshall added, however,
that he would limit circulation of the letter." Counsel for the government thereupon sent a messenger with the letter to Jefferson at Monticello, who returned it with a certificate stating that he was withholding
only confidential matters having nothing to do with the pending
charges.'2 Since the trial had in the meantime been progressing very favorably for Burr, l" he apparently accepted the redacted version,2' and
did not pursue the matter further prior to his acquittal on the remaining
charges shortly thereafter. 26
This pragmatic series of rulings established the pattern that future
courts have followed-insisting on their power to compel presidential
testimony, but exercising that power in a way maximally protective of
the officeholder's official functioning.
To be sure, after the trial, Jefferson, who had a long history of
conflict with Marshall and believed that the Federalists sitting on the
bench had a partisan bias against him, complained that Marshall had
been wrong in his decision, particularly in asserting in dictum the right
to compel his personal attendance. It would be impractical, Jefferson
118. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 30, 37; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON CORRESPONDENCE (W.C.
Ford ed. 1916) (photoreproduction of subpoena on unnumbered page between 144 and 145; court
clerk's endorsement states: "The transmission to the Clerk of this Court of the original letter...
will be admitted as sufficient observance of the process without the personal attendance of any ...
of the persons therein named").
119. See Burr,25F. Cas. at 55, 65.
120. See 2 REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 514 (David Robertson ed.
1808); 3 THETRIAL OF COL. AARON BURR, 25, 28 (T. Carpenter ed., 1808).
121. See 2 REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR, supra note 120, at 514; 3 THE
TRIAL OF COL. AARON BURR, supra note 120, at 28-30.
122. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 187, 190-92.
123. See id. at 193; 3 THE TRIAL OF COL. AARON BURR, supranote 120, at 46.
124. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 55, 180-81 (acquitting Burr on the most serious charges).
125. See 3 THE TRIAL OF COL. AARON BURR, supra note 120, at 39, 46.
126. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 187, 201.
127. See William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and his Contemporaries,9 J.L. & POL.
595, 604 (1993).
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asserted, to expect him and his cabinet officers to be removed from their
constitutional duties and "be dragged from Maine to Orleans by every
28
1
criminal who will swear that their testimony 'may be of use to him."
Nonetheless, during the trial itself Jefferson wrote the court:
if the defendant suppose there are any facts within the
knowledge of the heads of departments or of myself, which
can be useful for his defence, from a desire of doing anything our situation will permit in furtherance of justice, we
shall be ready to give him the benefit of it, by way of
deposition ... at this place."'29
In keeping with this precedent, President Monroe, in 1818, sent
interrogatory answers to the court martial of his appointee, Dr. William
Barton, after having been served with a subpoena by the defense and
advised by the Attorney General that he was required to provide information, although not necessarily to attend the trial, and President Grant
provided deposition testimony from the White House to assist the defense of one of his associates accused of corruption. 3 °
Since this history was not widely known, by the time of Watergate
some commentators considered the President's amenability to process
doubtful.' However, in October of 1973 the en banc United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a subpoena
from the Watergate grand jury for tape recordings of presidential conversations,'32 and President Nixon chose not to appeal the decision."'
Any remaining doubts about the President's obligations to respond
to judicial testimonial demands were convincingly dispelled nine
4
months later by the unanimous opinion in United States v. Nixon,'"
which relied heavily on Burr to uphold a trial subpoena that, subject to a

128. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 1807), reprinted in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 95, at 241-42; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (Sept. 7, 1807), reprinted in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 95, at 365.
129. Burr,25 F. Cas. at 55, 69.
130. These episodes, along with several similar ones, were rescued from obscurity by an assistant counsel to the Senate committee investigating Watergate. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief HistoricalFootnote, 34 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 3, 5-6

(1975).
131. See Nathan Lewin, Subpoenaing The President,NEw REPUB., June 9, 1973, at 19; On
Taking A President Before a GrandJury, N.Y. TWIEs, June 10, 1973, at E14 (two letters to the
editor); "PresidentNixon Can Be Made to AppearBefore the GrandJury", WASH. POST, June 1,
1973, at A25 (letter to the editor).
132. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,722 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
133. See 2 NIXON,supra note 96, at 937; VOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supranote 99, at 72-73.
134. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss4/3

40

Freedman: On Protecting Accountability

19991

ONPROTECTINGACCOUNTABILITY

series of safeguards, compelled the President to surrender tapes and

documents for use in the Watergate prosecutions of many of his key

aides and political operatives. 135 Despite some pre-judgment hints that

he might not comply with an adverse ruling-a course of action that
would surely have resulted in his immediate impeachment and conviction 3 6-President Nixon produced the materials, and was forced to re-

sign as a result of the disclosures in them.
Applying this ruling the following year, a District Court overruled

the government's objections and directed enforcement of a subpoena
issued to President Ford by a criminal defendant accused of attempting

to assassinate him.13' But it made sure to minimize any inconvenience;
the lawyers traveled to Washington, and the President gave his testimony on videotape in his office. 3
In the Iran-Contra affair, the courts showed this same pattern of

maximum deference, but ultimate compulsion. In the prosecution of
Colonel Oliver North, the trial judge ruled that the Presidential materials
sought were not necessary to the defense, thus mooting any questions
concerning the mode of compliance. 9 In the prosecution of Admiral
John M. Poindexter, the trial judge ruled: (1) The materials sought from
135. See id. at 702, 723-25; see also WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 263-64
(Justices unanimously decided against President day after argument).
136. See 2 NiXON, supra note 96, at 630 ("In the event that the Court ruled flatly against me
in the tapes case, I could decide to defy the ruling. But that would almost certainly bring about
impeachment and therefore could not realistically be considered.").
137. See United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
138. See Lucinda Franks, Fromme Jury Hears Ford Tape; Testimony First by a President,
N.Y. TIES, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1; see also Fromme, 405 F. Supp. at 583. Thereafter, President
Carter testified in several less-remembered cases: for the prosecution at the federal gambling conspiracy trial of two Georgia officials, who were acquitted, see Susan Fraker et. al, A Superstar
Witness, NEwSWEEK, May 1, 1978, at 33; to a grand jury investigating charges that Robert L.
Vesco attempted to apply improper influence to the administration to fix his legal problems, see
Edward T. Pound, Jury in Vesco Case Sees Carteron Tape, N.Y. TImS, Mar. 2, 1980, at A39, an
investigation that ultimately ended with the grand jury declining to bring any indictments, see
Laura A. Kiernan & Charles R. Babcock, 18-Month Vesco Probe Ends With No Indictments,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1980, at A3; at a deposition taken by special counsel Paul J. Curran investigating improprieties at his peanut warehouse, see Justice Clears CarterWarehouse, 11 NAT'L J.
1783 (1979); and at a Justice Department deposition regarding lobbying by his brother Billy, see
Neil A. Lewis, President'sStrategy: PutBurden on Starr,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998, at A13.
139. See United States v. North, No. 88-0080-02, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903, at *1-6
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1989) (refusing to enforce a subpoena issued to ex-President Reagan and noting
that court had previously quashed subpoena issued to ex-Vice-President, and sitting President,
Bush; court had power in both cases, but defendant had failed to show that subpoenas likely to
yield relevant evidence); Christopher Walther, Comment, Legitimacy: The SacrificialLamb at the
Altar of Executive Privilege, 78 KY. L.J. 817, 832-33 (1989-90) (agreeing with United States v.
North insofar as it affirmed court's power, but criticizing it for imposing excessively heavy
threshold burden on defendant seeking evidence).
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President George Bush (who had been Vice-President during the relevant period) were irrelevant or cumulative; ° (2) The court would con-

duct an in camera inspection of portions of the diary kept by Ronald
Reagan while he was President to determine whether they had to be
turned over to the defense; 4' (3) The defense was entitled to take the
videotaped deposition of former President Reagan concerning his conduct in office, but under the supervision of the trial judge, at a time and
place convenient to the witness, and in secret, so that the government
would have the opportunity to move for redactions from the testimony
before it was made public.'" Rulings (2) and (3) were both made over
vigorous objection, 43 but former President Reagan complied without
seeking appellate review."
As of this date, President Clinton has given testimony four times,
all by videotape: in support of the defense in a federal criminal trial
arising from loan fraud committed in connection with the Whitewater
land venture; 45 as a defense witness in the federal criminal trial of two

Arkansas bankers charged with misapplication of funds in connection
with his 1990 gubernatorial campaign; 146 at his deposition taken as a de-

140. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 30 (D.D.C. 1989).
141. See United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (D.D.C. 1989). After conducting this examination, the court initially determined that some of the entries were relevant, see
United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135, 141 (D.D.C. 1990); David Johnston, Reagan is Ordered to Provide Diaries in Poindexter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at Al, but ultimately
refused to provide them to the defense in light of the government's assertion of executive privilege, and Admiral Poindexter's opportunity (described in the text) to take the former President's
testimony. See United States v. Poindexter, No. 88-0080-01, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2881, at *1415 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1990); David Johnston, Poindexter Loses Fight for Reagan Notes, N.Y.
Tritns, Mar. 22, 1990, at A20.
142. See United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 165, 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1990); United
States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 160 (D.D.C. 1990).
143. See David Johnston, ReaganAsks Court to Kill Subpoena, N.Y. TnvIES, Dec. 7, 1989, at
A27; see also Anthony Lewis, Not by Divine Right, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at A35 (praising
rulings in light of history, and because "the royal view of the Presidency has been rejected by the
courts once again").
144. See David Johnston, Reagan Testifies He Did Not OrderAny Illegal Acts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1990, at Al.
145. See Stephen Labaton, Clinton Denies Any Links to Whitewater Case Loan, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 1996, at Al. The defendants, James and Susan McDougal and incumbent Governor Jim
Guy Tucker of Arkansas, were convicted. See Stephen Labaton, Clinton Partners in Arkansas
Deal Convicted by Jury, N.Y. TamS, May 29, 1996, at Al; see also supra note 59.
146. See Stephen Labaton, Clinton Denies Trading State Jobsfor Gifts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19,
1996, at A16. The defendants were acquitted of many of the charges, see Stephen Labaton, 2 Acquitted by Whitewater Jury; Mistrial Declaredon Other Counts, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al,
and independent counsel Kenneth Starr decided to drop the remainder. See Jerry Seper, Starr
Closes Book on Arkansas Bankers; He Won't Try Them Again for Fraud,WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1996, at A6.
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fendant in the civil sex harassment case brought by Paula Corbin
perjury
Jones;' 47 and to a grand jury investigating whether he committed
48
or obstruction of justice in connection with that testimony.

This lengthy history provides a solid basis for predicting what
would happen if the President became the subject of a criminal prosecution: the courts would extend every possible procedural protection,
and their efforts would amply protect the officeholder against vexation.
Since there are presumably many more situations in which it might be
plausibly claimed that the President has relevant evidence than ones in
which it might be plausibly claimed that the President has committed a

crime, the case for testimonial immunity is-from the point of view of
safeguarding against harassment-stronger than the case for criminal
immunity. The fact, therefore, that the courts have been able to reach
appropriate accommodations in the testimonial context strongly supports the view that they would be able to do so in the criminal context.
2. Self-Protection
The President has ample assets for self-defense, including rich legal resources, a unique ability to mobilize public opinion, and unparalleled control over prosecutorial decisions. As a practical matter, it is far
more likely that an ill-inclined President could launch a harassing investigation of a judge who had rendered unfavorable rulings, or of a
Senator or Governor perceived as a potential rival, than that one of these
officeholders could instigate an unfounded investigation of the Presi-

147. See Jones Looks on As Clinton Testifies at Deposition; PresidentResponds to Accusationsfor Six Hours, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 1998, at Al. Eventually, the District Court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark.
1998); Francis X. Clines, Paula Jones Case is Dismissed; Judge Says Even if Tale is True, Incident Was Not Harassment,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al. While this ruling was on appeal, the
case settled. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1123 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
148. See John M. Broder & Don Van Natta, Jr., Clinton Agrees to Testify For Lewinsky
Grand Jury; Starr Retracts Subpoena, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Al; Eric M. Freedman,
Clintonand the Irresistible Urge of History,LEG. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1998, at 2.
Subsequently, as part of an investigation by Attorney General Reno into whether she
should call for an independent counsel to investigate alleged violations of campaign finance laws
during President Clinton's 1996 re-election effort, President Clinton was questioned by Justice
Department lawyers and F.B.I. agents at the White House; there was a similar interview of VicePresident Gore a few days later. See James Bennet, Justice Dept. Questions Presidentin '96 Campaign FinanceInquiry, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1998, at Al; Gore Interviewed About Campaign
Advertising, N.Y. TIIES, Nov. 12, 1998, at A4. The Attorney General then decided against seeking the appointment of an independent counsel. See Robert Suro, Reno Won't Seek Probe by
Counsel on '96 Ads; Reno Decides Against Independent Counsel Probe of 1996 Clinton Ads,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at Al.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:677

dent. 149 That existing prosecutorial power has not been abused, and is
apparently subject to adequate political checks when seen to be abused,
is good empirical evidence of the weakness of the harassment objection
as applied to the President.
3.

Statutory and Judicial Protection

Quite apart from the safeguards already created by the judiciary in
the testimonial context, any future President under indictment would

benefit from unique legal safeguards against harassment. Some of these
exist currently, and, as I discuss in Part II, others could be put in place if
Congress wished. But let us for the moment take the worst case from the
harassment standpoint. Assume Congress does nothing, the independent
counsel statute expires, and a meritless prosecution is commenced by
state authorities. 5 ' The President still (1) would have the benefit of the
federal removal statute, 5 ' and (2) access to the federal courts to enjoin
the vexatious proceedings. 5

149. Further, as discussed below, even if such an event took place, the President would have
legal protections that the other officeholders would not. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying
text.
150. In this regard, it is worth recalling that, as in the case of Labor Secretary Raymond J.
Donovan, see supra note 31, demonstrated, there is no existing barrier to states indicting federal
officials. See Whitehead v. Senkowski, 943 F.2d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Contrary to Whitehead's assertion, the state is not without power to prosecute federal officials from the outset."); 1
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcncE 10.6[5], at 249 (2d ed. 1996) ("Federal
officials are not immune from state criminal prosecutions for violating a valid criminal law of the
state"). Yet there seems to have been no widespread abuse of the power.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994) (any officer of United States may remove to federal court
prosecution commenced in state court "for any act under color of such office"). The Supreme
Court has long stressed the key role of this statute in assuring the vigorous functioning of the federal government. See, e.g., Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402,406-07 (1969) (statute should be
broadly construed); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) (statute is constitutional even if the
alleged crime is a violation of state law because otherwise the federal government would be unable
to defend its existence against the states); see also E.W.M. Mackey, Removal of Criminal Causes
From State Courts to FederalCourts, 1 CRIM. L. MAG. 141, 142-46 (1880) (arguing this position).
While the Court in Mesa v. California,489 U.S. 121, 138 (1989) (no removal of state
traffic prosecutions where defendants pleaded no connection to federal office), might be said to
have shown some disposition to halt expansion of the statute, it wrote a very narrow opinion, as
the concurrence emphasized, see id.
at 140 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring), and the winning
attorney recognizes. See Kenneth S. Rosenblatt, Removal of Criminal Prosecutions of Federal
Officials: Returning to the Original Intent of Congress, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21, 86-87
(1989). In light of the historic deference of the courts to the convenience of the President, it is
highly likely that removal would be upheld virtually anytime that officer sought it.
152. The Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), while stating a general
presumption against federal court injunctive interference with state criminal proceedings, nonetheless reaffirmed the traditional exception for bad-faith, harassing prosecutions, id. at 47-49. It further added, "Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is
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To be sure, the pursuit of these legal remedies might require some
portion of the President's attention, but the defense of impeachment
proceedings may well require no less-and, in the cases meriting serious concern, that is likely to be the alternative.'53
C. The Intrusiveness Objection
This objection differs from the harassment objection in focusing on
the claimed disruption to the functioning of the President resulting from
potential, as opposed to actual, prosecutions. The concern is that, intimidated by the prospects of criminal liability, the officeholder would
be deterred from the appropriately energetic exercise of duty.
Richard Nixon made a very similar argument in support of the
position that his tapes should be guarded by an absolute privilege,' and
the Court's response is equally applicable to the present context. The
Nixon Court did not hold that nothing is privileged; it simply held that
not everything is privileged. It rejected a claim of absolute privilege
"based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality," but specifically left it open to the President to claim particular privileges, notably
for our purposes, the "state secrets" privilege 55 as articulated in United
States v. Reynolds.'56
The determination of the applicability of that privilege, in turn,
rests on a case-by-case balancing of the need for disclosure against the
importance of the interest asserted by the demanding party.'57 Some
cases are so obviously at the core of executive functioning that further

no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be." Id. at 54. While the success rate of
litigants seeking to establish bad faith has been virtually nil in the years since, and there has as yet
been no clear Court description of what might be meant by "unusual situations calling for federal
intervention" see 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
4255 (2d ed. 1988) (reviewing post-Younger cases), an allegedly harassing state criminal prosecution of a President would seem to fall comfortably within both exceptions.
153. It is worth noting in this regard that an impeachment resolution is one of the highest
privileges on the floor of the House of Representatives-meaning that, notwithstanding any other
pending business, any Representative with the floor may set the machinery in motion at any time.
See LEwIs DESCHLER & WILLIAM H. BRoWN, PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 14, §§ 2.2, 2.5, at 163-64 (4th ed. 1987); see id. ch. 14, § 5.7, at 166. Such a Congressman will surely be found in any plausibly serious case-and if there is no other way to get the
President to respond to the charges (e.g. of tax evasion), the process may well move forward
whether or not impeachment is the appropriate remedy for the conduct at issue.
154. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,705-07 (1974).
155. See id. at 713-715 & n.21.
156. 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
157. See id. at 11.
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inquiry is precluded; one example, said
the Reynolds Court, is a breach
58
of contract action by an alleged spy.
There is no reason to doubt that the same ruling would properly be
made if we imagine a criminal fraud action launched against the President for failure to pay the spy. 5 9 On the other hand, if the President
killed the spy in the Oval Office as a result of a heated dispute over the
season's prospects for the Washington Redskins, a court should reach
the opposite conclusion, since only the most ephemeral of public purposes would be served by a holding that the President had immunity in
that context."o
The argument advanced here is simply that the President is amenable to prosecution, and has no generalized criminal immunity. But
after that threshold has been crossed, there might well be a particularized substantive privilege if in a specific case there were some concrete
reason to believe that the various objections considered in this Section
were actual rather than theoretical; in other words, just as they do in
civil actions, the courts would distinguish between officeholders' amenability to suit, and the substantive standards governing liability. 6' The
resulting legal regime, in fact, would be analogous to the "totality of the
circumstances" civil immunity recognized for state governors in
Scheuer v. Rhodes.6 2
To be sure, any such formulation leaves a zone of uncertainty, but,
as the courts have recognized in similar contexts, there is no empirical
support for the intuitively unlikely proposition that this will chill the
vigor with which public servants discharge their duties,6 certainly not

158. See id. at 11 & n.26 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)).
159. There would be ample legal materials available to guide this ruling, since, in a wide variety of contexts, the courts considering questions of civil immunity have weighed how central the
challenged action is to the appropriate discharge of the officeholder's function, and then tailored
the immunity accordingly. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
160. Cf Howard Schechter, Essay, Immunity of PresidentialAides from Criminal Prosecution, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 779, 797-98 (1989) (Except in rare cases, neither the President nor
his aides should have absolute criminal immunity, but a judge should "perform a balancing test
based on the action taken in light of both the need to have an effective and efficient functioning
executive and the societal interest involved.").
161. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,407-12 (1997) (discussed supra note 82).
162. 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (discussed supra note 81).
163. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 & n. 20 (1974) ("C[v]e cannot conclude
that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of
disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a
criminal prosecution.") (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1933)) (Cardozo, J. for a
unanimous Court) (Despite theoretical possibility of chilling candor, privilege against intrusion
into jury deliberations subject to case-by-case exceptions to investigate wrongdoing; "mhe
chance that now and then there may be found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears
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to the extent that would outweigh the benefits I have already canvassed
at such length.

II. PART II: POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
The issue of Presidential criminal immunity is one of constitutional
law and will eventually be decided by the Supreme Court. But Congress
could play a modest but helpful legislative role in this area.
Section 1. HarassmentIssues
In my own view, the country would be better off if the Congress
were to re-enact the independent counsel statute' 61 when it comes up for
renewal. One reason of relevance to our discussion today is that the
statute has procedures for preliminary review by the Attorney General
that are designed to reduce the chances of ill-founded inquisitions.6'
Furthermore, although I see no empirical need for such action, if there is
a genuine concern with the prospect of harassment by state prosecutors,
Congress could easily amend the law to make this statutory route the
exclusive means of investigating any suspected Presidential crimes,
state as well as federal.'1
Similarly, Congress might choose to broaden the federal removal
statute to cover officeholders prosecuted for state crimes committed
prior to their incumbencies.'67

and give way to their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice.");
see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980) (While allowing federal prosecutors to
use evidence of state legislator's official acts "may have some minimal impact on the exercise of
his legislative function," Court will not "impair the legitimate interest of the Federal Government
in enforcing its criminal statutes [for] only speculative benefit to the state legislative process.").
164. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1994).
166. Such a statute, designed to protect the unassailable federal interest in a functioning
Presidency, would plainly be constitutional. See Freedman, supra note 1, at 65-66 nn.201-02.
167. Cf. Application of Donovan, 601 F. Supp. 574, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (acknowledging
that "the indictment of a cabinet officer interferes with the administration and operation of the executive branch of the federal government," but holding that the removal statute as presently written does not provide for removal on that ground). The case is discussed supra notes 31, 150.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:677

Section 2. NationalSecurity Issues
As I have discussed at greater length elsewhere,"6 the Iran-Contra

prosecutions revealed some vexing problems with the statute, problems
whose constitutional underpinnings lead me to discuss them here.
Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh was forced to drop key
charges-including the entire indictment against CIA agent Joseph Fer-

nandez, the most important accusations against Colonel Oliver North,
and a portion of the case against Admiral William Poindexter-because
executive branch officials, many of them political intimates of the de-

fendants, were in a position to block the release of classified information. 6 9 Once the government (i.e. the Justice Department) had deprived
the defendants of information relevant to their defenses, the prosecutor
(i.e. the independent counsel) could not constitutionally proceed against
them. 170
Since the very purpose of the independent counsel statute is to prevent the executive branch from controlling the prosecution of cases in

which it may be laboring under a conflict of interest, the impropriety is
manifest.17 ' At first glance, the remedy may appear simple: since the independent counsel represents the United States for purposes of the
prosecution, the independent counsel should represent the United States
for the purposes of determining whether the classified material should
be released.

168. See Eric M. Freedman, Open Legal Questions Remaining After Iran-Contra, in
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE WORLD 263 (Eric J. Schmertz et al. eds., 1997).
169. See Two Charges Against Poindexter Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1989 at B6;
David Johnston, U.S. Drops Partof its CaseAgainst Iran-ContraFigures,N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1989, at A7; Michael Wines, Key North Counts Dismissedby Court,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1989, at
Al; see also Justice Delays Iran-ContraJustice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1989, at A24 (criticizing
Justice Department's performance).
170. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 149 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal
of indictment against Joseph Fernandez); see also John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519, 537, 541-42 (1998) (describing this sequence of events
as "at odds with the fundamental purpose and the general provisions of the independent counsel
law itself," and proposing a statutory amendment to grant to independent counsels the authority
over classified information hitherto exercised by Attorney General).
171. In the case of the Iran-Contra prosecutions, the situation was not aided in the least by the
fact that the "classified" information that Attorney Generals Meese and Thornburgh sought to
protect was both innocuous and widely known. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMrTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN CONTRA AFFAIR, S. Rep. No. 216, H.R. Rep. No. 433,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 144 (1987); Anthony Lewis, Government of Laws?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1989, at A31.
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That resolution, however, raises a constitutional concern. If "the
power to protect national security information were vested in a prosecutor not fully accountable to the President,"'' then the President's control
over foreign relations would certainly be diminished, and, if one were to
misread some of the Supreme Court's broadest dicta in the area,1 73 unconstitutionally so.
However, it is a mistake to consider the power over foreign relations as exclusively Presidential. Even on its most expansive days, the
Court has recognized that Congress does have a role in the setting of
foreign policy and in determining how much discretion the President is
to have in carrying it out. 74 Thus, the President need not be the sole decisionmaker on the issue of whether or not the overall interests of the,
United States are best served by the disclosure of classified information
or by the dismissal of an indictment; the President's discretion can
properly be limited by legislative criteria.
For example, if, as one veteran of the Iran-Contra prosecutor's office has suggested, the relevant statutes were to be amended so that an
independent counsel were given the power to challenge on substantive
grounds the decision of an Attorney General to block disclosure of
classified information, 75' this procedure would be constitutional. Judicial
doctrines that call for a high degree of deference to executive branch secrecy decisions 76 are just that-judicial doctrines. They are subject to
modification by Congress, which might, for example, require the Attorney General to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court "by a prethe disclosure would cause irponderance of objective evidence that
''
reparable harm to the United States. 1
Without endorsing any particular statutory language, I call this issue to your attention, not just because it happens to be a problem with
the statute, but specifically because it is one that is plainly intensified if
the President may be indicted,7 and deserves attention in that context.
172. United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465,471 (4th Cir. 1989).
173. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
174. See id. at 319-20.
175. See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel
Prosecutions:Balancingthe Scales of JasticeAfter Iran-Contra,91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1651 (1991).
Plainly, the existing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6), has not done the job.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953).
177. Jordan, supra note 175, at 1674.
178. In the Iran-Contra situation, the concern of Attorney General Meese, for whatever reason, was not that President Reagan might be indicted for authorizing the transfer of HAWK missiles to Iran in violation of the National Security Act, but that he might be impeached for doing so.
See David Johnston, Meese Testifies That Impeachment Was a Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1989,
at A17.
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Section 3. PrivilegeIssues
Similarly, the recent narrowing of the governmental attorney-client
privilege at the Court of Appeals level is not limited to the President,'
but the application of such rules to the President 0 is plainly more trou-

blesome if that official is facing possible criminal liability, which might
be an additional consideration in moving Congress to correct the situation.
Section 4. Statute of Limitations

Some commentators who believe that the President is immune
from indictment also appear to assume that the Supreme Court, in ruling
to this effect, will further rule that the applicable statute of limitations is
tolled while he or she is in office.' Perhaps. But it would certainly be
prudent for the Congress to insure this result.' That could be done
without pre-judging the constitutional issue by a statute providing in
general terms for tolling with respect to any officer of the government
whose official position rendered him or her immune from indictment.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the dispute over whether the President is immune from
criminal liability is not a dispute exclusively, or perhaps even primarily,
about legal rules. It is, as the members of the first Senate saw,' 3 a clash
over how we conceive of our President and our country.
If the President is merely one of 'We the People', temporarily
delegated to perform certain functions, then the concept of absolute
immunity has no more resonance than in the case of any other officeholder, and is easily rejected. If, however, the President, upon taking
office, becomes a different order of being, one who embodies "the continuity and indestructibility of the state,"'4 then the issue takes on a different cast. In that case, an errant officeholder should first be removed-by a unique political process, rather than an ordinary legal
179. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925-26 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
180. See Inre Bruce Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
181. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 12, at 16.
182. This suggestion has been previously made by a commentator who disagrees with me on
the constitutional issue. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Presidentand the Independent Counsel, 86

GEO. L.J. 2133, 2157 (1998).
183. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
184. Bickel, supra note 12, at 15.
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one-so that the sacred nature of the office will not be profaned by the
outside intrusion of secular authority.

But this almost idolatrous view, which is precisely the one Thomas
Paine was ridiculing in the passage from Common Sense, alluded to in

the title of my 1992 article,'

is politically debilitating-not just be-

cause it feeds the imperial delusions of the President,'8 6 not just because
it frees the incumbent from popular control, but more importantly because it relieves We the People from the responsibility that we should
bear for the actions of the head of a representative government.
The difference between The Law as King and The President as
King is that the President is a person and The Law is not. The Law is an

abstraction, but an abstraction with real meaning; in a system of representative democracy, The Law is us. Subjecting our highest officeholder
to The Law thus represents our collective determination to be responsi-

ble for our own destiny.

185. See THOMAS PAINE, COMION SENSE 57 (Philadelphia 1776): "[L]et a day be solemnly
set apart for proclaiming the Charter, let it be brought forth placed on the Divine Law, the Word of
God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the World may know, that so far as we approve of
monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is Law,
so in free Countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." See generally
Christopher Collier, The Fundamental Ordersof Connecticut and American Constitutionalism,21

CONN. L. REv. 863 (1989) ("Events of recent years echoing those of the early 1970s, remind us
that our system of government is based on" Paine's concept); Richard Benveniste, Sirica'sLegacy,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1992, at A20, (letter to editor from former Watergate prosecutor on death of
Watergate trial judge John Sirica; '"is legacy is to remind us that in our system no one is above
the law.").
The second allusion in the title is to an action known to history as the "ship money" case.
Charles I laid a defense tax, and John Hampden, a leader of the popular party in the House of
Commons, refused to pay it on the grounds that Parliament had not authorized it. The Crown sued
for the sum in the Court of Exchequer, and, after elaborate argument, the twelve judges, by a split
vote early in 1637, ruled in favor of the King. Concurring in this judgment, Sir Robert Berkeley
stated: "I never read nor heard, that Lex was Rex, but it is common and true, that Rex is Lex, for he
is a lex loquens, a living, a speaking, an acting Law." THE TRYAL OF JOHN HAmBDEN ESQ. 131
([T. Salmon ed.] London 1719) reprinted in 3 STATE TRIALS 1098 (T.B. Howell & T.C. Hansard
eds. London 1816). This judgment is generally thought to have been the first act in a drama that
progressed to the impeachment of the Earl of Strafford, the Civil War, and the execution of Charles I. Long before the drama had reached its denouement, the judgment in the ship money case had
been vacated by Parliament, and Justice Berkeley had been impeached, convicted, and fined for
his role in it. See 3 STATE TRIALS, supra, at 1283-96, 1300-01; 6 H.L. JOuR. 214 (Sept. 12, 1643).
186. See XWlliam Safire, Creeping Royalism, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at A23 (criticizing
the Presidency for becoming too much like a Kingship).
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DEPARTMENT 01 JUTjICE

Memorandun
TO

: Leon Jaworski

rROm

: Carl B. Feldbaum, George T. Frampton,
Gerald Goldman,
Peter F. Rient

DATE:

February 12,

1974

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum

The attached memorandum was prepared on the basis

of extensive discussions among ourselves and after
consultation with other members of the legal staff.
We submit it to you in the hope that it may assist you
in deciding how best to proceed with respect to the
evidence now before the Watergate Grand Jury.
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Recommendation for Action By
The Watergate Grand Jury
This office will soon be called upon by the
Watergate Grand Jury for recommendations as to what
actions it

should take in light of the evidence that

has been presented to it.

Since this evidence implicates

the President in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, the
Grand Jury will no doubt be anxious to receive our recommendation, and the reasons therefor, concerning appropriate
action with respect to the President.

The purpose of

this memorandum is to aid the process of decision by
focusing attention on two possible courses of action
indictment and presentment -

-

and articulating the reasons

for which we believe tat one of these courses should be
recommended to the Grand Jury.
I.
The facts described to you in a separate memorandum,
in our view constitute clear and compelling prima facie
evidence of the President's participation in a conspiracy
to obstruct justice.

Assuming that the Grand Jury agrees

with this assessment, then we are compelled by (1) .our
mandate to investigate and prosecute allegations involving
the President,

(2) the Grand Jury's sworn duty to make
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true presentment of all offenses that come to its
knowledge,

and (3) te

paramount importance of reaffirming

the integrity of the law, to recommend that the Grand
Jury express its

judgment by the customary method of

indictment or (if

we conclude indictment is constitutionally

barred or is otherwise iiappropriate) by a presentment
setting out the evidence and the Grand Jury's conclusion
of criminal activity.
The proposition that we and the Grand Jury have a
duty to reach a conclusion whether the President .has acted
criminally and to manifest that conclusion by appropriate
action on the part of the Grand Jury follows from several
considerations.

In the first

place, the Special Prosecutor's

"duties and responsibilities* include *full authority for
investigating and prosecuting .
the President

..

.

. allegations involving

B.
E.O.
No. 551-73, 2 0.37 and App. A.

The history of the Watergate matter leaves no doubt that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor was established and
continued to exist because of overwhelming public support
for committing the decision of the President's criminal
guilt or innocence to the traditional processes of law
enforcement.

The need for a Special Prosecutor arose from

widespread public suspicion concerning the ability of the
Executive to identify and pursue any criminal wrong-doing
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by the President and his closest associates -- a suspicion
that created a crisis of confidence in the President, the
Presidency, and the criminal justice system.

The unique

arrangements creating and sustaining this office were a
direct result of public conviction that there should be an
independent, responsible body which could be trusted

not

only to investigate fully and vigorously all allegations
of criminal wrong-doing, and to determine, on the basis
of all available evidence, whether crimes had in fact been
committed, but also to do so in like fashion as in the case
of allegations of crimirdl activity involving anyone else.
urthermore, tht Grand Jury -- which exists wholly
apart from these arrangements and indeed "is a constitutional
fixture in its own right," Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700

-

is obliged under the oath of office taken by each of its
members "diligently, fully and impartially [to] inquire

"'"

into and true presentment make of all offenses which will
come to [its] kaowledgeO and to *present no one from hatred
or malice or leave anyone unpresented from fear, favor,
affection, reward or hope of reward . . .

To recbmmend-

to the Grand Jury any action inconsistent with a definitive
conclusion about the President's criminal liability based
on the extensive evidence that it has received would thus
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be to counsel abdication of its constitutionally
sanctioned function to "present" crimes committed by
any citizen, regardless of his circumstances or station.
This leads to another consideration --

the

necessity for vindicating the integrity of the law.
No principles are more firmly rooted in our traditions,
or more at stake in the decision facing this office and
the Grand Jury, than that there shall be equal justice
for all and that "(n)o man in this country is so high
that he is above the law."
196, 220 (1882).

United States v..Lee, 106 U.S.

For us*or the grand jury to shirk from

an appropriate expresion of our-honest assessment of
the evidence of the President's guilt would not only be
a departure from our responsibilities but a dangerous
precedent damaging to the rule of law.

The inevitable

conclusion would be that one man, at least, is so far
different from anybody else as to be above the ordinary
processes of the criminal

law.

The implications of such

* a conclusion would be unfbrtunate under ordinary circumstances; but we are not faced with ordinary circumstances

--

we are dealing with the very man in whom the Constitution
reposes not only the most power in our society but also
the highest and final obligation to ensure that the law
is obeyed and enforced.

Thus, failure to deal evenhandedly
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-5with the President would be an affront to the very
principle on which our system is built.

And this

failure wpuld be all the more severe because of the
nature of the crime in question, a conspiracy to obstruct
justice the purpose of which was to place certain
individuals beyond the reach of the law.

The result

would probably be greater public disrespect for the
integrity of the legal process than has already been

.created

by public knowledge of attempts by the nation' s

highest officials to put themselves beyond the law.*
It

follows from this analysis of- our responsibilities

and those of the grand jury that our duty is to make a
recommendation with respect to the President"which is
directed toward enforcement of the criminal law.

The

existence of the impeachment mechanism in no way alters
this conclusion.

Impeachment is an avowedly "political"

process by which the people's representatives can remove
a sitting President before the end of his term based on a
"political" judgment about his fitness to govern.

Although

Another possible consequence is an increased likelihood
of wrong-doing by a future President who need not fear the
strictures of the criminal law as a limitation on the
exercise of his immense power.
*
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- 6the matter is subject to debate, Congress'

judgment

about impeachment, in our view, is meant to respond
to considerations that may or may not include and, in
any event, ire not limited to whether the President has
committed a crime.

The Constitution, in other words,

does not require that a felony have been committed for
conviction upon impeachment, nor does it
felon be ousted from office.

demand that a

In contrast, our criminal

justice process exists, and is universally perceived to
exist, for a different

purpose, entailing a different

standard: to prosecute crimes with referenca to an
apolitical code applied objectively to all citizens.
For this very reason our office was created as an office
of criminal prosecution, not (as it might have been) as
an independent commission to determine all the facts and
then to make recommendations about anyone's fitness to
continue to serve in public office.

Under the Constitutior

the one task is allocated to Congress and the other to the
grand and petit juries.
The constitutional allocation of these separate
functions means that to let "political" considerations
of the kind now being debated in Congress intrude upon
the decision-making of this office and of the Grand Jury
would be to confuse the functions of law enforcement
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-7and of impeachment, and the result would be further
to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the
legal process.

A recent precedent seems instructive.

A substantial segment of the public was critical of the
plea bargain reached with Vice President Agnew not only
be6ause they perceived that on account of his position
.Agnew was. given much more favorable treatment than would
have been afforded others guilty of similar crimes, but
also because they perceived that a motivating force in
this bargain was the desire of those in power to remove
him from public office.

in accomplishing this, the

Executive Branch was regarded as taking upon itself the
decision of fitness for public office.

This not only

usurped a decision constitutionally allocated to anothe-i"
institution -

the Congress could, after all, have

decided against Agnew's impeachment

--

but was seen in

the public eye as a departure from the principle of
equal justice for all.
Thus, we believe that it would be impermissible
for this office to determine its course of action on
the basis of a belief that the President should or
should not be removed from public office.

By the same

token, we cannot responsibly.leave the question of the
President's criminal guilt or innocence to the "political"
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process and the "political" judgment of impeachment.
To do so, we feel, would be an abdication of our duties
and those.of the Grand Jury, premised only on the view
'that for the most powerful official in the country, the
essence of "justice" is limited to the decision of his
fitness to.govern and to ouster from office if he is
found wanting.

The Constitution

itself decries such

a premise by stating that a person convicted after
impeachment "shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishmeri

according

If the President were placed so much apart from

to Law."

all other citizens that he could even escape the
determination of whether there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime, one can only
imagine how much greater the public cynicism would be.
Thi.s is not to say that no room exists for interplay between the functions of law enforcement and of. impeachment.

We and the Grand Jury would obviously be

remiss if we allowed the impeachment process to go forward
without full knowledge of what the President has in fact
done.*

And, indeed, there is precedent for a Grand Jury

• Disclosure of the facts concerning the President's involvement should not occasion undue pretrial publicity problems
for any of our defendants since the facts add little
to thoae
which will, in any event, be charged in the indictm~ent.
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-9presentment to the House of Representatives of specific,
criminal charges and the evidence supporting them, for
the purpose of impeachment.

See 3 Hinds'

the House of Representatives

5

2488,

Precedents of

at 985'(1907).

But

assuring that the House has at its disposal information
concerning the President's involvement in Watergate does
not fulfill our function or that of the Grand Jury.

Wle

and the Grand Jury do not exist merely for the purpose of
assuring that'.debate on impeachment is fully informed.
In short, we do not believe that mere transmission
of our evidence to Congress is a satisfactory mdans of
discharging our responsibilities or those of the Grind
Jury.

Nor do we believe that our decision about how to

proceed in the matter of the President should be influenced
by the likelihood that some "polDical" mechanism will
determine his "fitness" for office or by any 9ther abstract
notion of how "justice" can be served other than by enforcement of the criminal law.

We and the Grand Jury are the

only ones.who can miake the decision that we, in largd part,
were established, and the Grand Jury is sworn, to make -the decision whether the President has acted criminally.
If we and the Grand Jury refuse to make that judgment, the
consequences for the criminal justice system and for
public confidence in the law will, in our view, be most
uifortunate.
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II°
Assuming the validity of the foregoing conclusions,
the question'to be addressed is whether we should recommend
to the Grand Jury an indictment or a presentment of the
President.
As we understand it, the conclusions regarding
indictment of an incumbent President reached by the
Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney's office, and
this office, ere all consistent: there is nothing in the
language or legislative history of the Constitution that
bars indictment of a sitting Presidbie,

-but there are a

'number of *policy" factors that weigh heavily against it.
'Chief among these are (1) that indictment would be
equivalent to substantially disabling, if not functionally
removing, th e President from office -

a decision that is

Constitutionally allocated to Congress and not to a
prosecutor's office and Grand Jury; and (2) that indictment
would create a dangerous precedent'for abuses in the future,
even if justified by the facts in this case.
Before addressing these considerations relating
to the President's indictability, we should point out that
we recognize that these "policy" factors are relevant not
only to the question whether thd President can legally be
indicted but also to the question whether, as a matter of
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prosecutorial discretion, he should be.

We-need not be

convinced in other words, of the unconstitutionality of
indictment to recommend against it. The issue of
"prosectorial discretion," however, does not arise in
the traditional sense.

The factors that *customarily inform

an exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to press all
the charges wirranted by the evidence uniformly militate
in favor of indictment in this case.

These include the

nature of the offense and strength of the evidence, the
background and. other activities of the potential defendant,
his degree of culpability, the extent of his cooperation,
and the presence .or Asence of various mitigating circumstances.*

Rather, the "policy" .factors 'advanced against

the appropriateness of indicting

the President-are more

general public policy or quasi-Constitutional considerations
cncerning the proper relationship between the President,
the criminal justice system, and the Congress.
For many of the same reasons set out in the first
part of this Memorandum, some of us cannot easily accept

* Apparently, the only significant defense available to
the President should he be indicted appears to be a legal
defense based on constitutional provisions concerning his
tenure in office -- provisions that do not absolve him of
liability once he leaves office and that in no way mitigate
his culpability.
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the proposition that such "policy considerations" -in essence, political considerations -- should be
dispositive of the President's indictability.

While

not suggesting that such matters are entirely outside
our purview in-deciding upon whether indictment is the
proper course, we believe that too heavy reliance on
them threatens abdication of our peculiar responsibility
in favor of another process designed to produce a
different, kiid of decision, and risks further public
disillusioment with the principle of equal (and unpoliticized:
justice.*

In short, there is a good.argument that in

deciding whether the President can appropriately be
indicted, it is not up to us to weigh

.thepolitics of

the matter at all hut to do our job and do it faithfully.
In evaluating the considerations against indictment,
we believe tbat the second one mentioned -

that of creating

a dangerous precedent --

To begin with,

has little

merit.

* Congress, as the people's representative, is in a far
better position to weigh these factors. It may decide, for
example, to remove the President from office but to immunize
him from prosecution. Whatever its decision, Congress will
have acted openly and the people and history can judge the
validity of its decision. We would be formulating public
policy in private, and there is nothing in our mandate or
backgrounds that gives us expertise or responsibility for
such a policy-making role.
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the argument sweeps with too broad a brush, for the
possibility of abuse inheres in the exercise of any
responsibility.

Moreover, the quantum of proof we believe

should be required to support a recommendation of indictment
(or presentment) -- that the evidence of the President's
guilt be direct, clear, and compelling, and that it
of no misinterpretation --

is

admit

a substantial bulwark against

future abuse and against charges of improper action on our
part.

Furthermore, the fact that the President normally

exercises the ultimate prosecutorial authority of the"
Federal Government and can, in the ordinary course, prevent
his subordinate officer- and employees from prosecuting
him conclusively puts to rest any fear that maverick or
partisan prosecutors might subject the President b unjustified future harrassment in the Federal courts.*

In

the case before us, of course, both the Legislative and
Executive branches have recognized the uniqueness of the
situation by endorsing creation of a special officer
explicitly authoriied to "prosecute" allegations concerning

Even if the President can be indicted in the federal
courts, we believe there is no question.but that considerations
of federalism would bar his indictment in a state court and
that adequate remedies for preventing such action exist.
Thus indictment of the President for federal crimes will
not provide a precedent for local prosecutors who might
seek to harrass the President by indicting him for local
or state crimes.
*
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the President himself, and insulated to a considerable
extent from contrary instructions or dismissal by the
President.

If at some future time circumstances require

appointment of a new "Special Prosecutor," then the
precedent set here would not be a dangerous one.

More-

over, even if the risks of future abuse were great, which
we think they are not, those risks' would have to be weighed
against the harmful precedent of failing to act appropriately
in the case before us.

The best way to prevent a situation

like the one we have now from occurring again

is to assure-

that the criminal justice process fulfills its

historic.

responsibilities,.thus reaffirming the principle that the
President, like everyone else, is subject to prosecution
for commission of serious crimes.
The other serious argument against indictment is
that it would be the "equivalent" of impeachment because
if

the President were convicted and incarcerated (and even

if

he had to prepare for and undergo trial) he would no longer

be able to discharje the duties of his office; and in any
event the country.would be brought to a standstill prior
to trial by the existence of outstanding and unresolved
charges against a President who refused to resign or was
not impeached.
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The answer, to this argument is that the disruption
caused by indictment and trial of the President would be
no greater, and possibly less, than that caused by the
impeachment process.*

The institution of criminal charges

might well reduce considerably the time during which the
disxuptive effect was felt, considering how quickly Mr.
Vixon could be tried on a specific charge based on tapes
and a few prosecution witnesses, contrasted with what
promises to be a terribly drawn out, divisive, and possibl
inconclusive process of impeachment and trial in Congress
on a variety of less distinct charges.
Moreover, at ledst some of our evidence showing
the President's complicity in illegal act'i ty"is probably
going to become public in any event, particularly if

we

have an obligation to communicate the evidence to the
Congress.

If our primary concern is the impact of that

information on the conduct of our domestic and foreign
affairs should the President attempt to remain in office,

* Of course, the President clearly could not perform the
duties of his office while in jail, but the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment provides a mechanism by which the Vice President
can govern the country should the President become "unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office."
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then it might be better for it

to come out in the

traditional legal form of specific, distinct allegations
which can then be determined to public satisfaction in a
traditional proceedifig according to a customary standard
applicable to all citizens.

The fact that some evidence

of criminal activity will probably become public in any
event also means the pu]bic will eventually realize we had
evidence we did not act upon.

This would cektainly raise

serious questions about the performance of this office and
the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Finally, the Framers obviously contemplated some
disruption in the Executve Branch

as a necessary and

bearable cost to providing the people -- through the
impeachment mechanism -- with a remedy for gross misconduct.

Since the Framers did not specifically provide

for Presidential immunity from indictment, it

could be

concluded that they also contemplated that if a President
engaged in serious criminal activity destroying public
confidence in the Executive, the same cost should be
borne in connection with institution of ordinary criminal
charges.
In the final analysis, if

imposition of criminal

charges indeed results in uncertainty and paralysis in the
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conduct of governmental affairs, the remedy is readily
impeachment,

available in the hands of Congress

--

that is,

if

--

and the. grounds for

the President refuses to resign

impeachment will then mquestionably be on the table.

If

the people then believe that such an impasse is intolerable,
they will compel their representatives to act.
-Although, we are of different minds about the final
outcome in balancing these considerations relating to the
President's indictability, we all agree on the fundamental
premise of this memorandum:

the real issue before us is

not whether to recommend that the Grand Jury manifest its
conclusion about the President's guilt or innocence, but
how we should recommend that it

do so.

If we conclude that

indictment of the President is constitutionally barredor is
inappropriate, then we and the Grand Jury can and must
fulfill our responsibilities to the public and to the
law by recommending a Grand Jury presentment setting out
in detail the most important evidence and the Grand Jury's
conclusions that ihe President has violated certain criminal
statutes and would have been iridicted were he not President.
There appears to be no question of the propriety or legality
of such a course, and there is precedent for it
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pointed out above.*
Expression of the Grand Jury's conclusion about
the President's. guilt through a presentment, rather than
formal institution of charges by indictment, meets most
of the arguments against indictment canvassed above.

A

presentment would raise no spectre of Presidental preparation
for a trial or possible imprisonment.
presentment might still

Moreover, although

affect the ability .of the Executive

to conduct governmental affairs, it would not functionally
disable the President or result ipso facto in his removal
from office.
Presentment offers the additional advantage- of
focusing the issues that must be resolved by Congress
without infringing on Congress' constitutional perogatives.
While indictment would set in motion an independent process
for determining Presidential guilt or innocence, perhaps
adding to the present ambiguity regarding institutional
A separate question wolild then be- raised whether or not
to name the President as a co-conspirator in our main
indictment.
The evidence is clear the the Presidert joined
the conspiracy that"will be charged in that indictment.
Failure to name him as a co-conspirator in our case would
serve no purpose since we would have to name him in our Bill
of Particulars in any event. In addition, the existence of
a presentment would, vitiate the strongest argument against
naming the President, that of "fairness', as is discussed
in the following text.
*

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss4/3

70

Freedman: On Protecting Accountability

1999)

Appendix
- 19 -

responsibilities,, presentment would signal to Congress
our belief that no further action can or should be taken
through the ordinary criminal process against a sitting
President.

The result would be that responsibility for

further action would be placed squarely upon Congress,
and that Congress would then have an unambiguous basis
for swift action.
On the other hand, presentment arguably raises
an additional problem not raised by indictment
of "fairness" .to the President.

-

lack

The President, it may

be urged, has no way to meet or contest charges articulated
in a presentment.
be dismissed, it

Although logically the problem cannot
seems more theoretical- than real.

It

should be remembered, first, that this is a "problem"
created by a desire to avoid the even greater "problem"
for the

President of indicting him.

To put the point

another way, the alleged unfairness to the President must
be weighed against the unfairness to the ,public and the
damage to the ruld of law' should we and the Grand Jury,
contrary to our responsibilities, altogether fail to act
on the evidence that we have gathered, thereby depriving
the public of our conclusion about what that evidence shows.
Moreover, the truth of the matter is that the-President
has almost unlimited access to the media and the evidence
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in his own possession.

He is, therefore, in a position

to answer any. charges directly to the country.
In reality, it

is the people who have not had the

opportunity to have a disinterested and independent
representative of the public interest examine the evidence
and arrive at an informed and professional conclusion about
what it shows.

That is the reason we are here. That is

the reason we have concluded that the only responsible
recommendation we can make to the Grand Jury is that if it
finds clear and compelling prima facie evidence'that the
President participated in a conspiracy to obstruct justice,
the Grand Jury should -inifest
In sum, if

that conclusion.

the Grand Jury finds probable cause to

believe the President acted criminally, then it

is essential

that this simple, primary truth emerge from the action we
and the Grand Jury take:

that but for the fact that he is

President, Richard Nixon would have been indicted.

This

fundamental conclusion should not be allowed to be lost
in a recitation of facts or sources of evidence that
omits the basic judgment involved or leaves it open to
public (and Congressional) speculation and debate.
a critical omission would, in our view,

Such

(1) avoid the

mandate of the .Special Prosecutor to investigate and
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prosecute allegations involving the President, .(2)
evade the .responsibility of the Grand Jury to make
true presentment of all offenses which come to its
knowledge,

(3)

confuse the distinct purposes of the

crimizial justice system and the political system, and,
(4) ultimately, dilute the force of law in our social
and. governmental processes.

Carl B. Feldbaum
George T. Frampton
Gerald Goldman
Peter F. Rient
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THE CONSTITUTION BARS A CRIMINAL PROCkEDING"
AGAINST THE VICE PRESIDENT OP THE UNITED STATES

The Vice President of the United States holds office
either by vote of electors elected by the people or -the Twenty-fifth Amendment --

under

through nomination by the

President and confirmation by the Houses of Congress.
In either event, his title traces to the vote of
representatives of all citizens of the Republic.

He is thus

second only to the President in personifying the national
will and dignity.
The fuftotions of the office are by no means merely
symbolic.

The Vice President must maintain himself inIa

state of constant preparation to replace the President.

As

presiding officer and holder of the tie-breaking vote in
the Senate, he is regularly concerned with the deliberations
of that body.

By virtue of statute, executive order and

reorganization plan, he participates in

the'activities of

executive agencies ranging from the National Security Council
to the Domestic Council.

And finally,

under the Twenty-

fifth Amendment, he is charged with the most awesome
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responsibility:

Dontinously to monitor the ability of the

President to discharge the powersand duties of Chief
Executive

-

and to decide whether action should be begun

to remove the President by reason of disability.
A Vice President so elected and charged with such

duties may not, we submit, be hindered or prevented from
performing his office by the institution of a criminal proceeding against him. While he is Vice President, he must be
free to function as Vice President.

The Nation must not be

deprived of his services while he defends himself against an
indictment voted by perhaps 12 of 23 grand jurors, or an
information filed at the whim of a prosecutor.
Rather, the Constitutional plan requires that a
Vice President may be removed from his office or effectively
prevented from performing its duties only through impeachment
voted by the House, and judgment of conviction voted by the
Senate.

Having elected him through their representatives,

the people may be deprived of his services only by vote of
equal dignity.*
This does not mean, of course, that the man holding
the office of Vice President is above the law or beyond its
reach.

It means, rather, that he must hold the office and

be free to perform-its duties until his removal comes about
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in accordance with the Constitutional plan
resignation, or expiration of his tern.

--

by impeachment,

Once so removed,

the man will be as subject to the processes of the criminal
law as anyone else.

But the man having been removed, the

way is cleared for the choosing of a successor.

The Nation

will not be forced to do without a Vice President.
Nor will it have had to undergo the national indignity of a criminal proceeding against its second highest
officer.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
The conclusion here urged is not spelled out'with
total clarity in the language of the Constitution.

But at

least three provisions of the Constitution point clearly in
this direction.
"The Party Convicted"

Art. I, § 3, Cl. 7, provides:
'"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall
not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to law."
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The Framers' feeling for the nuances of our
language was, of course, extraordinary.
words casually.

They did not use

.And so it would appear that their use of

the past participle was significant:

a person "convicted"

in an impeachment proceeding is liable to criminal indictment after he has been impeached and convicted -- not before.
Until he has been convicted, he may not be Indicted, he may

not be tried, he may not be Judged and he nay not be punished.
Other readings are, of course, possible -

e.g.,

that the language is intended only to indicate that a

President or Vice President may be punished in a criminal,
'as well as an impeachment, proceeding.

But such other

readings, while conceivable, share a-lack of likelihood.
The non-exclusivity of impeachment, for example,
could have been spelled out quite readily without using a past
participle.

The past participle is given full significance

only when it is read to indicate a sequence of events.
Moreover, if read as dealing only with non-exclusivity, the language does not accomplish its purpose:

it does

not indicate that impeachment may follow criminal conviction.
The reason, we submit, is that the Framers did not intend to
permit criminal proceedings against a President or Vice
President prior to impeachment.
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Removal by Impeachment
Art. II, § 4, provides:
"The-President, Vice President and
all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

To give this language its fair meaning, it must
be read as being both authorization and prohibition:

it

sanctions removal by an impeachment proceeding, and not
otherwise.
This reading surely makes sense:

the President

and Vice President having been elected to serve by national
vote, their election should not be set at naught by criminal
proceeding or other means of effective removal.
The term "civil Officers," we recognize, causes

a problem in that it would seem to embrace cabinet officers
and others who have always been understood to be subject to

removal at the President's wish.

And if "civil Officers"

may be removed by the President, as well as by impeachment,

then perhaps Art. II, § 4, does not specify the exclusive
means of removing the President and the Vice President.
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The reasonable reconciliation, we suggest, is to
recall the contrasting sources of authority.

The President

and the Vice President are elected pursuant to the Constitution,
while "civil Officers" owe their office to.the President's
nomination.

It is wholly reasonable that those whom the

President chooses to carry out the executive will should be
subject to removal at his wish -- he can scarcely discharge
his duties of office with incompatible aides. .But the
President and the Vice President, who hold office by virtue
of an election under the Constitution, may reasonably be
removed from office only by a proceeding under the Constitution.*
The Twelfth Amendment
This reading is reinforced by consideration of the
Twelfth Amendment.
There seems never to have been any significant
doubt that Impeachment is the only technique by which the
President may be removed:

while he holds office he is immune

In the North Carolina debates on ratification, the issue was
squarely raised. Some of the delegates to the state's ratification convention expressed concern that impeachment should
be the only remedy against federal tax-gatherers who behaved
corruptly. Mr. Iredell answered the concern by suggesting
that such petty officers could be reached by local criminal
process. Governor Johnston, agreeing, pointed out however
that "men who were in very high offices could not be come at
by the ordinary course of justice;" but could be reached by
local authority only after Impeachment. 4 Elliott, Debates
on the Federal Constitution, 36-37 (1901) thereafter-ElIiott).
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against any form of criminal proceeding.4 The reasons were

eloquently stated a century ago by Attorney General Stanbery,
speaking on behalf of President Andrew Johnson:

"It is not upon any peculiar immunity
that the individual has who happens to be
President; upon any idea that he cannot
do wrong; upon any idea that there is any
particular sanctity belonging to him as an
individual, as is the case with one who has
royal blood in his veins; but it is on account of the office that he holds that I
say the President of the United States is
above the process of any court or the jurisdiction of any court to bring him to account
as President. There is only one court or
quasi court that he can be called upon to
answer to for any dereliction of duty, for
doing anything that is contrary to law or
failing to do anything which is according
to law, and that is not this tribunal but
one that sits in another chamber of this
Capitol. There he can be called and tried
and punished, but not here while he is
President; and after he has been dealt with
in that chamber and stripped of the robes
of office, and he no longer stands as the
representative of the government, then for
any wrong he has done to any individual,
for any murder or any crime of any sort
which he has committed as President,
then and not till then can he be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the courts. Then it

is the individual they deal with, not the
representative of the people."

State of

Mississipi

!7757r-M-

v.

Johnson,

71 U.S.

If the President may be called to account only by
impeachment proceedings, the Twelfth Amendment -- by providing

The position was most recently set forth publicly on behalf
of the incumbent President, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Misc.
No. 47-73 (D. D.C.), Brief In Opposition, Aug. 7, 1973. The
Watergate Prosecutor has not challenged the President's view.
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for the simultaneous and separate election of President and
Vice President

-

vould seem to give the latter the equal

immunity appropriate to his equal dignity.

THE PERTINENT HISTORY
The reading of the Constitution here urged is
borne out by the records of the Constitutional Convention
and contemporaneous documents.

These make clear the uni-

versal view of the time that criminal proceedings might be
initiated against a President or Vice President only after
his removal from office.
The Order of Events
A good starting point is Alexander Hamilton's
"Plan" for the Constitution, which contained this language
dealing with impeachment:
"[The President] nay be impeached
for any crime or misdemeanor by the two
Houses of the Legislature, two thirds
of each House concurring, and if convicted
shall be removed from office. He may be
afterwards tried and punished in the

ordinary course of law--"

3 Farrand, Records

of the Federal Convention of 1787, 625 (Rev.

Ed. 1966) (hereafter Farrand) (emphasis
added).
Thus Hamilton had no uncertainty about the appropriate order of events.

His language was not, of course,
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that ultimately adopted.

But its closeness to the final

text is warrant for the belief that he expressed the consensus.
.

Surely he so believed.' Writing in The Federalist,

and referring to the language as actually adopted, he wrote:"the punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment,
is not to terminate the chastisement
of the offender. After having been
sentenced to a perpe-tual ostracism from
the esteem and confidence, and honors
and emoluments of this country, he will
still be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of
law." The Federalist, No. 65
(emphasis added).
* *..

"The president of the United States would
be liable to be impeached, tried, and,
upon conviction of treason, bribery, or
other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards
be liable to prosecution and punishment
in the ordinary course of law."
he
Federalist,. No. 69 (emphasis added).
Light is shed also by the Framers' debates concerning whether the Supreme Court should try impeachments.
Gouverneur Morris, speaking against the proposal, said:
"A conclusive reason for making the Senate
instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of
impeachments, was that the latter was to
try the President after the trial of the
impeachment." 2 F-arrand 500 (emphasis
added).
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Thus Morris, too, understood the order of events to be as we
contend.
In the debates in North Carolina on -atification,
Governor Johnston said that "men who were in very high offices"
must be removed before criminal sanctions could be imposed.
Such men
.. . could not be come at by the ordinary
course of justice; but when called before
this high tribunal [the Senate) and convicted, they would be stripped of their
dignity, and reduced to the rank of fellowcitizens, and then the courts of common
law might proceed against them." 4 Elliott
37 (emphasis added).
Significant, too, is the decision of the Framers
not to allow impeachments to be tried by jury.

Luther Martin,

one of the Framers, later noted that the Convention had refused "to permit the tenure of their offices to depend upon
the passions or prejudices of jurors."

3 Farrand 401.

Instead,

the question of removal would be determined by the Senate.
But to read the Constitution as permitting -riminal proceedings before impeachment would have the very consequence which,
said Martin, the Framers sought to avoid -- letting the tenure
of the President and Vice President "depend upon the passions
or prejudices of jurors."
Finally; we may note de Tocquevillets understanding
that criminal proceedings may only follow impeachment:
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"But the great difference which exists
between Europe and America is, that in
Europe political tribunals are empowered
to inflict all the dispositions-of the
penal code, whilst in America, when they
have deprived the offender of his official rank, and have declared him incapable
of filling any political office for'the
future, their jurisdiction terminates
and that of the ordinary tribunals begin."
I de Tocqueville,
mocrac in America Il

(Reeve Trans.

l961).5

Thus the historical evidence suggests a universal
view that the Nation was not to be effectively deprived'of
its elected leadership by any criminal process.
One additional teaching emerges from this material:
in rejecting both the Supreme Court and juries as triers of
impeachments, the Framers made clear their determination
that the legislative branch, not the judicial, was to pass
on removal from office

-

an attitude reaffirmed in the re-

moval procedure of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.

To allo'

commencement of a criminal proceeding in the courts against
an incumbent President or Vice President would affront this
clearly-expressed intent.
The President and the Vice President
The historical material'discloses also that the
Framers held the Vice Presidency in the highest respect and
regarded the proper performance of its duties as critically
important.

They would scarcely, then, contemplate treating the
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President and the Vice President differently on susceptibility
to criminal proceedings.
Again we may let Hamilton be our initial guide.
The President and Vice President were to be elected in the
same balloting, he said, because the Vice Presidency required
"the appointment of an extraordinary person."
In the debates in the First Congress over salaries,

Elias Boudinot, of New Jersey, argued that the Vice President
should be granted a regular salary because
.. . he is to be elected in the same manner
as the President, in order to obtain the
second best character in the Union ....

[Clonsequently he ought to be respected, and
provided for according to the dignity and
importance of his principal character."

I Annals of Congress, First Cong., 650-651
(178) •
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said:
"[T]he Vice President . . . must always be '
ready to take the reins of Government when
they shall fall out of the hands of the
President; hence . . . he should . . . remain
constantly at the seat of government . . .
[to] devote his whole time to prepare himself
for the great and important charge for which

he is a candidate."

Id. at 646-7.

The Framers regarded the Vice ?resident's tiebreaking role as critically important.

In the early days

of the Republic, the Senate's small number made ties far
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more likely than today,

and the states, newly come together,

regarded each other with understandable jealousy and suspicion.

In these circumstances, the Vice President was required

to be a figure of national prominence, possessing confidence
as universal as possible.

Thus, in the ratification debate in

North Carolina, William Richardson Davie, one of the Framers,
expressed their thoughts:
"Mr. Chairman, I will state to the
committee the reasons upon -hich this
officer was introduced. I had the honor
to observe to the committee, before, the
causes of the particular formation of the
Senate -- that it was owing, with other
reasons, to the Jealousy of the states,
and, particularly, to the extreme jealousy of the lesser states of the power
and influence of the larger members of
the confederacy. It was in the Senate
that the several political interests of
the states were to be preserved, and where
all their powers were to be perfectly balanced. The commercial jealousy between
the Eastern and Southern States had a principal share in this business. It might
happen, in important cases, that the
voices would be equally divided. Indecision
might be dangerous and inconvenient to the
public. It would then be necessary to have
some person who should determine the question as impartially as possible. Had the
Vice-President been taken from the representation of any of the states, the vote
of that state would have been under local
influence in the second. It is true he
must be chosen from some state; but, from

Vice President Adams used his vote at least 29 times,
often on issues of critical importance. See Feerick,
From Falling Hands, 69 (New York.1965).
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the nature of his election and office, he
represents no one state in particular, but.
all the states. It is impossible that any
officer could be chosen more impartially.
He is, in consequence of his election, the
creature of no particular district or state,
but the officer and representative of the
.Union. He must possess the confidence of
the states in a very great degree, and consequently be the most proper person to decide in cases of this kind. These, I believe, are the principles upon which the
Convention formed this officer [Vice President3." 1 Elliott 42-3 (emphasis in
original).
These historical materials indicate, then, that the
Framers expected to find for the Vice Presidency a man of the
highest ability, and they thought it appropriate to confer
Upon him the highest dignity.

Nothing in the materials sug-

gests that they would have thought him any more susceptible
to a criminal proceeding than the President.
On one occasion, of course,
against a Vice President, Aaron Burr.

an indictment was voted
In

1804, following his

killing of 11amilton, New Jersey lodged an indictment charging
Burr with homicide.*

A group of Senators,

and Attorney-

General Dallas, separately petitioned the Governor of New
Jersey to quash the indictment,

and although the Governor

appears to have taken no official action, the.indictment was

At about the same time, a New York grand jury brought a
presentment charging Burr with the misdemeanor of sending
a challenge to a duel.
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allowed to die.

Moreover, the Senate was apparently so per-

suaded that the indictment was a nullity that a few months
late' it allowed Burr to preside at the impeachment trial of

Justioe Chase.

See Parmet and Hecht, Aaron Burr : Portrait

af an Ambitious Man, 224 (New York, 1967); Schachner, Aaron

Burr, 264-66 (New York, 1937); I Wandell, Aaron Burr, 307316 (New York, 1927).
In sum, history tends to confirm the fair reading
of the Constitution's language: the Vice President may not be
made a defendant in any criminal proceeding.
The Twenty-fifth Amendment
In adopting the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the Congress
and the States gave new proof that a functioning Vice President
is far too important to the Nation to permit his disablement
by criminal prosecution.
Thus the Amendment creates a new and heavy duty for
the Vice President: playing the key role in determining when
the President's involuntary removal from office should be
initiated.

And the draftsmen of the Amendment, by providing

for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency, "...

intended

to virtually assure us that the Nation will always possess a
Vice President."

Sen. Rep. 1382, 88 Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1964).

In the hearings that led to the Amendment, the importance of the Vice Presidency was continually stressed.
President Nixon, then a private citizen, spoke eloquently of

the need for a Vice President.
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.. . the man that I'think who generally is
best qualified to succeed to the Presidency
in the event that something happens to the
President is the Vice President of the United
State." Hearings, "Presidential Inability and
Vacancies in the Office of Vice President,"
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 239 (1964) [hereafter "Inability
Hearings"].

And he explained that belief by saying:
"The Vice President, particularly in recent
years, is cut in, in effect, on all of the
major decisions and, therefore, he is prepared to take over as President as no one
else, not the Speaker, not the Secretary
of State, no one else in the country, is
prepared to take over." Ibid.
And so President Nixon urged that an amendment be
adopted to insure that a Vice President, so "cut in . . . on

all of the major decisions" would always be "prepared" to
take over.
A Vice President busy defending himself against
criminal charges can hardly keep himself so constantly in
readiness.
President Nixon spoke also of the need to have a
Vice President instantly available:
"Today only one man in this world, in the
free world, can defend the security of the
free world in the event of attack. Only
one man's finger is on the trigger.
"The United States and the free world
can't afford 17 months or 17 weeks or 17
minutes in which there is any doubt about
whether there is a finger on the trigger,
. .

."

Inability Hearings at 242.

The United States can notthen afford to have its
Vice President off somewhere defending himself against criminal
charges.
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The Nation would have been in sore straits, indeed,
had Vice President Johnson been in a criminal court on
November 22, 1963.
Of course, if a Vice President were facing Impeachment charges he would be every bit as burdened as were he on
trial in a criminal court.

But that is precisely the best

reason why the House of Representatives -- rather than a
grand jury or a prosecutor -

should decide whether the Vice

President shall be diverted from his duties.

A grand jury

has a duty to level charges whenever it believes that..there
are charges to be answered -

it is none of the grand jury's

concern whether the matter is serious or trifling, whether
the Nation should give up its Vice President while the charges
are tried.

And importantly, the grand jury -an act upon the

vote of a bare majority of its 23 members, and in practice is
the instrument of but one man -- the prosecutor.

It i.

therefore eminently possible that a decision may be made on
the narrow basis of his personal views.
has the welfare of the Nation as its

The House, by contrast,

primary concern, and can

make the decision whether or not to accuse in the Nation's
interest.
body.

The House makes that decision as a deliberative

No single person's ambition or prejudice may control.

The decision is made by a fair cross-section of the body politic.
The Framers, no different than we today, could hardly have
conceived of a different 'esult.
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The language of the Constitution and the history
of its adoption, then, stand in the way of indictment of
the Vice President.*

There need be added only considerations

deriving from the structure of our government.
Thus, as we have noted, before the Twelfth Amendment.
the Vice President was likely to be the President's chief
political rival - he was the runner-up to the President in
electoral votes.

The Framers could scarcely have intended

that the President should have the power-fdrthwith to incapacitate his rival effectively by a unilateral judgment of the
Attorney General, the President's direct appointee.**
The situation is not different under the Twelfth

We should note that this conclusion does not depend "on
whether the alleged criminal" acts are said to have occurred
during the Vice President's tenure In office, nor does it
depend on the outcome of the scholarly debate as to whether
impeachment will lie for acts committed before assuming

.office.

It

is

our entire thrust here that the immunity is

not of the man but of the office.
ence when the acts took place.

And so it makes no differ-

And if impeachment will not

lie, then the accusers must wait while the Republic is served.
*l It

may be suggested,

of course, that a grand jury might not

return an Indictment requested by a federal prosecutor. There
are two answers. First, those experienced at the criminal
bar know that, as a practical matter, only the most inept
prosecutor will fail to obtain the indictment he requests;
he is, after all, alone writh the grand jury, and may present
to it and withhold such evidence as he wishes. Second, the
prosecutor does not need an indictment: he may frame the
charge so as to proceed by an information which he alone
need sign.
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Amendment.

If it were intended that the President 'should"

control the ability of the Vice President to remain in
office, the Vice Presidency would not be for a term certain
but would be an appointive office just as any other cabinet

post.
This becomes all the clearer in light of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment, making the Vice President the sole
initiator of any question of the President's ability to
serve.
In consequence, the Vice President must be immune
to criminal charge.
II
THE PROSECUTION-INSPIRED PUBLICITY BARS
GRAND JURY ACTION AGAINST THE VICE PRESIDENT

We have urged above that the Vice President, by
virtue of his office and during his tenure in office, may
not be subjected to prosecution and punishment-by ordinary
criminal process.

As against an incumbent Vice Presideht,

impeachment is the only -proper course.
The wisdom of the Pramers in so deferring customary criminal procedures is demonstrated by the experience
of the past two 'months. Since the first public announcement
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that an Investigation of the Vice President was under way,
there has been a constant stream of publicity -- so great
as to preclude any possibility that a grand or petit jury
could fairly weigh the natter on the evidence.
In all

probability, such publicity is

inevitable

when a Vice President is the subject of a criminal investigation.

And this inevitability reinforces the conclusion

that the House and the Senate

-

rather than a grand and

petit jury -- should determine whether the Vice President
shall be charged, and exonerated or convicted.
is

The Congress

accustomed to acting in the glare of publicity.

A jury

is not so experienced.
This is not a matter alone of the interest of the
incumbent Vice President in receiving a fair trial.
importantly, it

More

is a matter of the Nation's interest in

having its-Vice President properly treated.

Vindicatilnn of

that Interest compels the conclusion that a Vice President
*must be removed from office before he nay be subject to
routine criminal proceedings.
Here, regrettably, the inevitable publicity has
been perverted -- by 'he deliberate act of prosecutorial
officials.
In the affidavit supporting this notion we have
detailed representative samples of the outrageously prejudicial publicity campaign in which some Government officials
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have engaged.

It seems clear-beyond question that Govern-

ment officials have asserted that 'the Vice President has
engaged in plea bargaining.

They have said that the evi-

dence against him is "cold."

-They-havepublicly expressed

their opinion as to his guilt. 'They have publicized alleged
testimony and plea-bargaining negotiations of witnesses.
And they have made.public the purported results of lie detector tests.
'These statements violate the canons,* Justice
Department guidelines** and the local rules of this and
other federal courts.

*

But to say that this behavior

offends every codified rule of prosecutorial conduct does
not even begin to express the outrage of any lawyer familiar
with the criminal process.
These statements, moreover, are so clearly damaging
to the Vice President as a potential defendant, and they
have been so pervasively publicized throughout-the Nation,

*Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar

Association, DR 7-107(c).
**28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(6)(vi) (1972).
***See, e.g., Rule 16, Rules of the United Ztates District
Court for the District of Maryland; Rule 8, Criminal Rules
of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
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that it would be "blinking reality not to recognize the
extreme prejudice inherent" in their dissemination, Turner
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. .466, 473 (1965).

And, as in Estes

.v.Texas, 381 U.S. 532a 542-43 (1965), the porvasivenels of
the publicity and its so patently damaging character involves
"such a probability that prejudice will result that . . . [a
prosecution would be] deemed inherently lacking in due process."
The courts have recognized that, where the Gd6vernment so deliberately makes reasoned grand jury deliberation
impossible, a remedy will be afforded.

Thus, as -Judge

Prankel said In United States v. Sweig, 316 F.Supp. 1118,

1153 (S.D.N.Y. 2970), aff'd, 41 -P.2d 114 (2dCir.)j -cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971):
"Granted the historic proposition
that grand juries may roam fairly widely
(and certainly outside the limits of
Wigmorets concerns) in collecting their
factual beliefs, . . . it can hardly be

doubted now that prosecutors must observe
some limits of essential fairness in their
work with such investigatory bodies ...
Unless the.role of the grand jury as a
shield for the citizen as well as a prosecutorial agency is to become an empty
slogan, there are kinds of pressure that
must obviously be avoided to the extent
possible. t However free may be the sources
of 'fact, the eneration of public animus
against a prospective defendant with the
attendant danrger that grand jurors may be
to subtle or explicit 'demands
sub Rected
or prosecution. .,.
is no part of the
p'osecution s legitimate business."

citations omitted, emphasis added).
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Cf., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 633-634
(9th Cirz3.968); United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 593
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912 (1957); United
States v. .Kahaner, 204 P.Supp. 921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1963).
These cases indicate that, Vhere the prosecution
has so betrayed its responsibility, the prospective tefendant must be protected.
In an ordinary case, with a Vice President not
involved, prosecution-inspired publicity of the magnitude
here present could be remedied, if at all, only by barringgrand jury action -until the prejudice had been dissipated -If ever.
Here, we submit, the proper remedy is to bar grand
jury action at least so long as the Vice President holds
office -- for only when he becomes a private citizen, if
then, can he be treated as fairly, by a grand jury, as any
other citizen.
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CONCLUSION

The motion should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,.
PAUL, WEISS, HIFKIND. .WHARTON & GARRISON
1775 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

By:
Jay H. Topkis
Martin London
Max Gitter
Of Counsel:
Judah Best
George Kaufman

September 28, 1973
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
I

In Re Proceedings of The Grand Jury
Impaneled December 5, 1972:.
N54ication of Spiro T. Agnew
Vime President of the United States

:
z
z

Case Ntmber
Civil 73-965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
CONCERNING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S
CLAIM OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY
The motion by the Vice President poses a grave
and unresolved consitutional Issue:

whether the Vice

President of the United States is subject to federa3 ;rand
jury investigation and possible indictment and trial -while
still in office.
Due to the historic independence and vital function
of the grand jury, motions to interfere.with or restrict its
investigations have traditionally met with disfavor.

See,

e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Branzburg
v. Eayes, 408 U.S.

665 (1972); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.

530 (1971). -Thus in ordinary circumstances we would oppose
litigious interference with grand jury proceedings without
regard to the underlying merits of any asserted claim of
immunity.

But in the special circumstances of this case,

which involves a constitutional issue of utmost importance,
we believe it appropriate, in the interest of both the Vice
President and the nation, that the Court resolve the issue
at this stage of the proceedings;
Counsel for the Vice President have ably advanced
arguments that the Constitution prohibits the investigation
and indictment of an incumbent Vice President.
the weifht of their contentions.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

We acknowledge

In order that judicial

99

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:677

-2-

resolution of the issues may be fully informed, however,
we wish to submit considerations that
conclusion:

that

suggest a different

the Congress and the judiciary p6ssess

concurrent Jurisdiction over bllegations made concerning
r Vice President.
This makes it
Justice

state

conclude that

now its
an

appropriate that

the Department of

intended procedure should the Court

ncumbent Vice Piesident is

amenable to

federal jurisdiction prior to removal from office.
United States Attorney will, in that event, c

The

plete the

presentation of evidence to the grand jury and awai*-thbat.
body's determination of whither to return an indictment.
Should the grand jury return an indictment'-the Department
will hold the proceedings in abeyance for a reasonable time,
if the Vice President consents to a delay, in order to offer
the House of Representatives an opportunity to consider the
desirability of impeachment proceedings.The Department believes that this deference to the
House of Representatives at the post-indictment stage, though
not constitutionally required, is an appropriate acconmoda.
tmon of the respective interests involved.

It reflects a

proper comity between the different branches of government,
esp.cially in view of the significance of this matter for 'hc
ation.

We also appreciate the fact that the Vice PresiC ".:

has expressed a desire to have this matter considered in
forum provided by the Congress.

ibt"

The issuance of an indictmeut,

if any, would in the meantime toll the statute of limitations
and .preserve the matter for subsequent judicial resolution.

We note that the Speaker of the House, Representative
Wf
Carl Albert, though declining to take action at this stage,
has not foreclosed the possibility that he might recoenO
House action at a subsequent stage.
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-3He will first state the posture of this matter
and then offer to the Court considerations based upon the
ConstitutionIs -text, history, -and rationale vhich indicate
that -a24 civil officers of t~e United States other -than
the President are amenable to the federal -criminal process
either before or after the conclusion of impeachment
proceedings.
STATEMENT

-

A grand Jury in this District, impaneled December
5, 1972, is currently conducting an investigation of possible violations by Spiro T..agnew, Vice President of the
United States, and others of certain provisions of the
United States Criminal Code, including 18 U.S.C. 1951, 1952
and 371, and certain criminal provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.

This investigation is now well

advanced and the grand jixy is in the process of receiving
evidence.

-.

The Vice President has moved to enjoin "the Grand
Jury from conducting any investigation looking to his possible indictment * * * and from issuing any indictmen , presentment or other charge or statement pertaining to [him]"
(Motion, p. 1).

The Vice President has further noved "to.

enjoin the Attorney General of the United States, the United
States Attorney for th.e District of Maryland and all officials
of the United States Department ofi-ustice. from presenting
to the Grand Jury any testimony, documents, or other materials
looking to possible indictment of (him] and from discussing
with or disclosing to any person any such testimony, document
-or materials" (Hotion, pp.1-2).
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ThbcVice President's motion is

based on two

(.) that 0[the Constitution forbids that

contentions:

the V&ce President be indicted or tried in any criminal

cour, .and (2) that Oofficials of~the prosecutorial arm
have engaged fw a steady campaign of statements to the
" re

which could have no purpose and effect other than

to prejudice any grand or petit jury hearing evidence
xelating to the Vice President *

'

p. 2).
4
(Motion,

On September 28, 1973, this court dir-cted that
the Department of Justice submit Its brief on the constitutional, issue on October 5 and its brief on the remaining
issue on October 8, that the Vice President's counsel 'ile
a reply brief on October 11, -and that -oral argument be had
on October 12.

This Memorandum is submitted on behalf of

the United States, the grand jury, and the individual
respondents named in the motion, in oppsition to the claim
that the grand jury should be enjoined because the Vice
President cannot
courte

(otion,

t

'be indicted or tried in any criminal

p. 1).

THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
HISTORIC PRACTICE UNDER IT
DO NOT SUPPORT A BROAD IMMUNITY
XOR CIVIL OFFICERS PRIOR TO PEMOVAL
analysis of the Constitu ion's text indicates that
no general imunity from the criminal process exists for
-civil officers who are subject to "ipeachment.
A.

Constitution
The .Only Explicit mmunity in theCongressmen.
na the Limited Immunity Granted

The Constitution provides no explicit imunity from
c.zinal sanctions for any civil officer.

The only express

imunity in the entire document is found in Article I, Section
6, which provides:
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The Senators and Representatives

*
shall in all Cases except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be priv-

ileged from Arrest during their Attendance
at the Session of their respective Bouses,
-and in going to and returning from the
same * *
Since the Framers knew how to, and did, spell

out an immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity
exists where none is mentioned.

Indeed, any other reading

would turn the constitutional text on its head:

the con-

struction advanced by counsel for the Vice President
requires that the explicit grant of immunityt'

legislators

be read as in fact a partial -ithdrawal of a completei

-

nity legislators would otherwise have possessed in.common
with other government officers.
was to the contrary.

The intent-of the Framers

Cf. United States v. Johnson; 383

U.S. 169, 177-185 .(1966).
in the face of this strong textual showing it
would require a compelling constitutional argument to
erect such an immunity for a Vice President.

Counsel for

the Vice President contend that such an argument is provided by Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, by Article I1,
Section 4, and by the Twelfth Amendment.

We will examine

each of these contentions in turn.
B.

The Meaning of Article I,

Section 3, Clause 7.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall
not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of Bonor, Trust or Profit
under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
"Punishment, according -to law.
Counsel for the Vice President argue that this
clause means impeachment must precede indictment.
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records of the debates of the constitutional convention,

hcweer;" show that the Framers contemplated that this
sequence should be =andatory only as to the President.
During

ost of the debate over the impeachment

clause, the Framers' attention was directed specifically
to the Office of the Presidency, and their remarks strongly
suggest an understanding that the President, as Chief
Executive, would not be subject, to the ordinary criminal

process.

See 2 Firrand, Records of the Federal Convention

64-69, 626 (New Raven, 1911).

For example, as the memorandum

=ubmitted on behalf of the Vice ?xesident points out (Memo.,
p. 9), Gouvenuer Morris observed that the Supreme Court
would 'try the President after the trial of impeachment."
2 Farrand,. supra, at 500.

It is,

of course, significant

that such remarks referred only to the President, not to
the Vice President and other civil officers.
However,. the Framers did not debate the question
whether impeachment generally must precede indictment.
Their assumption that the President would not be subject
to criminal process was based upon the crucial nature of
his executive powers.

Moreover, the debates concerning

the impeachment clause itself related almost exclusively
to the Presidency.
/

-

The impeachment clause was expanded

s a recent commentator.has observed:
One thing is clear: in the impeachment debate
the Convention was almost exclusively concerned with
the President. The extent to which the President
occupied center stage can be gathered from the fact
that the addition to the mpeachment clause of the
*Vice President and a1 civil officerso only took
place on September e, shortly before the Convention
adjourned. JBerger, Impeachment: The Constitutional
Problems 100 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973)]
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to cower the Vice President and other civil. officers only
toward jhe very end of the convention.

Berger,

Impeachment:

The Constitutional Problems 146-147 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
Indeed creation of the Office of the Vice Presidency itself
c"e in the closing days of the tonstitutional Convention."
S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 9 (1965).

Thus

xone of the general impeachment debates addressed or considered
the particular nature of the powers of the Vice President or
other civil officers.

Certainly nothing in the debates sug-

gests that the immunity contemplated for the President would
extend to any lesser

officer.

as it applies to civil officers other than the
President, the principal operative effect of Article I,
-Section 3, Clause 7, is solely the preclusion of pleas of
double jeopardy in criminal prosecutions following convictions upon impeachments.

The President's immunity rests

not only upon the matters just discussed but also upon his
unique constitutional lposixTion

.

-powers.

See infra, pp.

There are substantial reasons, embedded not only in the
-constitutional framework but in the exigencies of government,
for distinguishing in this regard between the President and
all lesser officers including the Vice President.
Notwithstanding the paucity of debate or contemporaneous cunmentary on the issue, it

is clear that the

Zramers and their contemporaries understood that lesser

bmpeachable officers are subject to ctimiial process.
fMrst Congress, many of

The

bbse members had been delegates to

the Constitutional Convention, promptly enacted Section 21
,f the Act of April 30# 1790, 1 Stat. 117, recognizing that

sxtting federal judges were criminally punishable for bribery
a=n providing for their disqualification from office upon
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conviction.

Jind in 1796, "Attorney General Lee informed

Congress that a judge of a territorial court, a civil officer subject to impeachment, .vas indictable for criminal
offenses while in office.

3 Hinds, Precedents of the House

of Representatives 982-983 (Washington, 1907).

These consi-

derations, together with those rooted In the constitutional
text and practicalities of government that we discuss
below, have led subsequent commentators to conclude, with
virtual nanlmity, that the Framers did not intend civil
officers generally to be immune from criminhl process.
Soo,

See,

wale, A View on the Constitution of the United States

of America 169, 215

Philadelphia, 1829); Simpson, supra,

52-53; Feerick, Impeaching Federal Vudges:

A Study of the

Constitutional Provisions,. 39 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 55 (1970).
The sole purpose of the caveat in Article 1,
Section 3, that the party convicted upon impeachment may
nevertheless be punished criminally, is to preclude the
argument that the doctrine of double jeopardy saves the
offender from the second trial. This was the interpretation
of the clause offered by Luther Martin, a mie ber of the Constitutional Convention and Judge Chase's counsel, during
Chase's impeachment. 14 annals of Congress,
Bess., p. 423.

th Cong., 2d

In truth, impeachment and the criminal

process serve different ends so that the outcome of one has
no legal effect upon the outcome of the other.

James Wilson,

an important participant in the Constitutional Convention, !/
put the matter succinctly:

!fJames Wilson was the strongest member of this Ithe
Pennsylvania] delegation and Washington considerd him to be
one of the strongest men in the convention. * * * He had
served several times in Congress, and had been one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence. At forty-five
he was regarded as one of the ablest lawyers in America."
Parrand, 2he Framing of the Constitution 21 (New Haven, 1913).
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-9ZMpeachments*
* come not *
within
-the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence.
They are founded on different principles;
are governed by different maxims, and are
directed to different objects; for this
reason, the trial ai~d punishment of an
offense in the impeachment, is no bar to
a trial of the same offense at conmon law.
[IWilson, Works 324 (Cambridge, Mass.,
.1967) ;1* Mecause the two processes have different objects,

the condderations relevant to one may not be relevant to
the other.

For that reason, neither conviction nor acquittal

in one trial, though It may be persuasive, zeed automatically
determine the result in the other trial.

To take an obvious

example, a civil officer found not guilty by reason of
insanity in a criminal trial could certainly be impeached
monetbeless.

The argument advanced by counsel for the Vice
President, which insists that only a party actually convicted
upon 1upeachment may be tried criminally, would tie the two
processes together in a manner not contemplated by the
Constitution.

Impeachment trials, as that of President

Andrew Johnson reminds us, may sometimes be influenced by
political passions and interests that would be rigorously
excluded from a- criminal trial.

Or somewhat more than one-

third of the Senate might conclude that a particular offense,though properly punishable in the courts, did not
vonviction on impeachment.

arrant

Hence, if Article 1, Section 3,

Clause 7, were read to mean that no one not convicted upon
impeachment could be tried criminally, the failure of the House
to vote an impeachment, or the -failure of the impeachment in
the Senate, would confer upon the civil officer accused
complete and -

were the statute of limitations permitted to

run -- permanent immunity from criminal prosecution however
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plain his guilt.

-

There is no such requirement in the

Constitution or in reason.

To adopt that view would give

Congress the power to pardon by acquittal or even by mere
inaction, since the officer would never be .a "Party convicted"
upon impeachment, even though.the Constitution lodges the
power to grant clemency exclusively in the President.

The

Framers certainly never supposed that failure to obtain
conviction upon impeachment conferred permanent criminal

immunity.
The -conclusion seems required, therefore, that the
Constitution provides that the "Party convicted" is nonetheless subject to criminal punishment, not to establish the
sequence of the two processes, but solely to establish that
conviction upon impeachment does not raise a double jeopardy
defense in a criminal trial.! *

A similar conclusion has

been reached under state constitutions containing provisions
*/ The Congress could only avoid this result by attending
to complaints of criminal conduct against aLl civil officers
so protected. Since the Office of the Vice President appears
indistinguishable in this respect from that of other' civil
officers, the construction of the Constitution offered by
counsel for the .Vice President would place a significant
burden on the Congress. As the result of historic experience,
the Congress has chosen to make sparing use of its impeachment
power. The Souse is not structured to act with any frequency
as a prosecutor nor the Senate as a jury. A construction of
the Constitution that forces the Congress to choose between
impeachment or immunization would deprive Congress of the
discretion of how and to what extent it wishes to exercise
its impeachment jurisdiction. it might alio frequently immobilize the Congress, preventing it from dealing with pressing
national affairs, to the hare of both Congress and the country.
!/
Just as an individual may be both criminally prosecuted
and deported for the same offense (see FongYue TinV. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)), a civil oi car EoUld be botn
Mpeached and criminally punished even absent the Article It
Section 3 proviso. Moreover, the.civil nature of an impeachment
under the Constitution renders the English precedent -- involving
an impeachment process that was both criminal and political -inapposite. Whereas conviction of impeachment under our Constitution has no criminal consequences, impeachment in England was
designed to accomplish punishment as well as removal, for peers
ef the realm were not subject to ordinary criminal process. As
a consequence, the relationship between the impeachment power
and the criminal process in the two countries is wholly
d fferent. See generally, Berger, supra, 78-85.
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odeed upon Article Is Section 3, Clause 7.

These state

constitutional provisions have been held not to bar prose-

cutfon of impeachable state officers while in office.
e.g.

*Commonwealth

See,

v. Rowe, 112 NY. 482, 66 S.W. 29 (1902)1

State v. Jefferson, 90 IN.J.L.-507, 101 A. 569 (E. & A., 1917).
Indeed, indictment, trial and conviction of state officers
vile inx office has been cmmon.

See generally, Anno: Officer

- Conviction of Crime, 71 A.L.R. 2d.593 (1960).
C. The Meaning of Article I1,Se6tion 4.
Article 11, Section 4 provides:
The President, Vice President and all
civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
-other high crimes and Misdemeanors.
2he Vice President's contention that he is immune
rom criminal process while in office rests heavily on the
asumption that even initiation of the process of indictment,
trial, and panisbment upon conviction, would effect his practical removal from office in a manner violative of the
exclusivity of the impeachment power (See, e.E., Memo., pp. 2,
5-6).

This assumption is without foundation in history or

logic.
We agree that conviction upon impeachment is the
exclusive means for removing a Vice President from office.
Uthough non-elective civil officers in the executive branch
may be dismissed from office by the President, and Senators
and Representatives may be expelled by their respective
gooses, historically the President, Vice President, and
federal judges have been removable from office only by
inpeachment. - /

But it is clear from history that a criminal

/ -We do not here address the question of whether 18 U.S.C.
$201(e) constitutionally operates to remove A civil officer
(footaote con't on next page)
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-22indictment, or even trial and conviction, does not, standing
alone, effect the removal of an impeachable federal officer.
As counsel for the Vice President point out (Memo.,
pp.. 14-15), one of his predecessors, Aaron Burr, was subject
to simultaneous indictment'in two states while in office,
Wt he .continuedto exercise his constitutional responsibilities until the expiration of his term.-/ Judge John Warren
Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
and Judge Albert W. Johnson of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvaniaere both*.
indicted and tried while in office; neither was-convicted,.
and each continued.to hold'office during trial. See -Borkin,
The Corrupt Judge 95-186 (New York, 1962). -Judge Eerner of
the Seventh Circuit, whose conviction is currently "pending
on appeal, has not yet been removed from office. Similarly,
the criminal conviction of Congressmen does not act to remove
them from office:

Othe final judgment of conviction Edoes]

not operate, ipso'facto, to vacate the seat of the convicted
Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him
as expelled by forcu alone of the judgment."

Burton v. United

States, 202 U.S. 344, 369.

!1

(footnote from previous page)

without impeachment. We only note that the federal statutes
contain no general provision, as do the statutes of many states,
providing that a vacancy exists in any civil office whenever
the incumbent is convicted of a serious crime. These statutes
have been upheld as operating to remove the officer without
impeachment. See State v. Sullivan, 188 P.2d 592 (Ariz. 1948).
See generally, Anno:offic
- conviction of Crime, 71 A.L.R.
2d 593 (1960). if such a statute were passed by tfne Congress,
Its application to judges, who serve during "good behavior"
(Article zz, s1) might be different than its application to
the Vice President, who has a term of office of four years
(Article 11, S1).
'( Apparently neither Burr nor his contemporaries considered
Mm constitutionally immune from indictment. Although counsel
f= the Vice President assert that Burr's indictments were
"a*l&med to die" (Memo., p. 15), that was merely because "Burr
thoat
it best not to visit either New York or New Jersey."
Pa-met & Hecht,Aaron Burr: Portrait of an Ambitious Man, 231
(New.Xrk, 1967-.
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'This Is not to say that trial. and punishment would
not. interfere in some degree with an officer's exercise of
bis public duties, .although, ar the case of Aaron Burr

i17ustrates, zere indictment standing alone apparently does
not seriously hinder full exercise of the powers of the Vice
lrxesidency.

But the .relationshipbetween trial and punish-

Ment, on the one hand, and actual removal from office, on
the other, is far.from automatic.

.. s perhaps the leading

American conmentator on impeacbmebt has observed (Simpson,
A Treatise x a

deral -Impeachment.52

Pbhiladelphiav 1916)):

A public officer may be criminally
convicted of trespass, though acting
i-der a claim of right, or for excessively speeding his automobile, yet
neither would justify impeachment. If,
however, the conviction was followed by
Imprisonment, impeachment might be well
cnaintained, for the office would be
brought into contempt if a convict were
allowed to administer it.
It may be
tsaid that, in that event, impeachment
would depend on the severity or lenity
of a trial judge, and this would be so,
but for the office's sake, a man may be
said to be guilty of a "high misdemeanor"
if he so acts as to be imprisoned.
Whether conviction of and imprisonment for minor offe.ses
must lead to removal on conviction of impeachment therefore
depends, in any given case, on the sound judgment of the
Congress and the President's exercise of his pardoning
power., Certainly it is clear that criminal indictment,
trial, and even conviction of a Vice President would not,
ipso facto, cause his removal; subjection of a Vice President
to the criminal process therefore does not violate the exclusvity of the impeachment power as the means of his removal
"fxom office.
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The Twelfth Amendment

Counsel for the Vice President suggest (Memo.,
pp. 7-8# 18) that adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, providing for separate elections of the President and Vice
President, in some way supports immunity for a Vice
President.

In fact, .the implication of the Amendment is

the contrary.*
The original constitutional plan was that each
elector should vote for two persons for President.

The. man

.receiving -the greatest vote wras to be *resident 'p was to be Vice President.

fdnner-

The Vice President vas thus the

next most powerful contender for the Presidency.

The Framers,

however, did not foresee the development of political

pirties

which ran *tickets," one man standing for President and the
other for Vice President.

an elector would then cast one

ballot for each of these candidates which had the embarrassing
result that Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, though regarded
by their party as candidates for, respectively, President
and Vice President, received an equal number of votes.

There

being no constitutionally elected President, the election was
thrown Into the House of Representatives.
The Twelfth Aendment, ,adopted in response, provided
separate elections so that a man wanted only as Vice President
should not thus block the election of the man wanted as
President.

The adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, therefore,

was recognition that the Vice President, nder a party system,
Is.pot the second most desired man for President but rather an
understudy chosen by the presidential candidate.

That recog-

nition does not magnify the constitutional position of a Vice
President.!/
/

Counsel for the Vice President additionally argue that since

(footnote con't on next page)
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TZE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
WORKINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM DO
210T IMPLY AN ZHMUNITY FOR A VICE PRESIDENT
The Constitution is an intensely practical document
and juddcial derivation of powers and immunities is necessarily based upon consideration of the document's structure
and of the practical results of alternative interpretations.
McCulloch v. Max
4 Wheat. 316 (1819)1 StuaZ'v. Laird,
I Cranch 299, 308 (1803)1 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S..649"-691
(1892); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
473 (1915); United States V. Curtis-Wright-Corp.,
304, 328-329 (1936).

459, 472299 U.S.

We turn, therefore, to a structural and

functional analysis of the Constitution in relation to the
inmunity claimed for Vice Presidents.
A.

Immunity Should be Implied for an Officer Only
if Subjecting Him to the Criminal Process Would.
.iubstantially Impair the Functioning of a Branch
of Government.

The real question underlying the issue of whether
indictment of any particular civil officer can precede conviction
upon impeachment -

and it is constitutional in every sense

because it goes to the heart of the oppration of government
-

is whether a governmental function would be seriously -im-

pairea if. a particular civil officer were liable to indictment

•

(footnote con't from previous page)

the Pramers could not have intended the President, through
his Attorney General, to harass political rivals, therefore
the Vim President must be i=nune from criminal process (see
Memo., p. 18). This argument appears unsound. Once he accepts.
the secondary office, the Vice President is rarely, if ever,
an important political rival of the incumbent President. Moreover, the logical implication of the argument is that all major
politicians - Senators, Governors, and many persons not even"
holding office -- must be freed of responsibility for criminal
scts.
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before being tried on impeachment.

The -answer to that

'question must necessarily vary with the nature and functions
of the office involved.
1. We may begin with a category of civil officers
subject to impeachment whom we think may clearly be tried
and convicted prior to removal from office through the

impeachment process: federal judges.!/ A judge may be
hampered in the performance of his duty when he is on.trial
for a felony but his personal incapacity in no way threatens
the abllty of -the judicial branch -to continue --effectively.

tion

There have been frequent occasions .where

death, illness, or disqualification has removed all of- the
available judges from a district or a circuit and even this
extreme circumstance has been met effectively by the assignment of judges from other districts and circuits.
Similar considerations apply to Congressmen, and
these practical judgments are reflected in the Constitution.
As already noted, Article I, Section 6 provides a very limited
immunity for Senators and Representatives but explicitly
permits them to be tried for felonies and breaches of the
peace.

This limited grant of immunity demonstrates a recog-

nition that, although the functions of the legislature are
not lightly to be interfered with, the public interest in
the expeditious and.even-handed administration of the criminal
law outweighs the cost imposed by the incapacity of a single
The Department of Justice is now contending that a United
States court of appeals-judge is subject to indictment, conviction, and sentencing prior to removal through the impeachment process. See United States v. Kerner, now pending in
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh C cuit. This, of course.,
is the historic position of the Department. See page 12,
suPra. It seems too clear for argument that other civil
officers, such as heads of executive departments, are fully
tubjectto criminal sanctions whether or not first removed from
office.
!/.
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le~islator.

Such incapacity does not seriously impair the

dunctioning of Congress.
. o. Almost all legal commentators agree,
on the
other hana, that an incumbent President must be removed
from office through conviction upon an impeachment before
Being subject to the "criminal process.

Indeed, counsel for

the Vice President takes this position (Memo, pp..5-8), so
it is not in dispute.

it will be. instrpctive to examine

the basis for that immunity n order to see whether its
rationale also fits an incumbent Vice President, for that
is the crux of the question before the Court.
As we have noted, pagd

6

,

supra, the Framers'

discussions .assumed that impeachment would precede criminal
trial becuse their attention was focused upon the Presidency.
See also, 2 Farrand, RecQrds of the Federal Convention, supra,
p. 500, iad Hamilton, The Federalist, Nos. 65 and 69.

They

assumed that the =tion's Chief Executive, responsible as no
other simjle officer is for the affairs of the United States,
would nor be taken from duties that only he can perform
unless azd until it is determined that he is to be shorn of
those duties by the Senate.
The scope of the powers lodged in the single man

occupying" the Presidency is shown by the briefest review of
Article IX of the Constitution.

The whole. "executive Power"

is vqsted in him and that includes the powers of the
wCommander in Chief of the Army and the Navy,w the power
tb command the executive departments, the power shared with
-the Senate to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, the
Wwer shared with the Senate to appoint Justices of the
Mpreme Court 'nd other civil officers, the power and
reiponsibiltty to execute the laws, and -the power to grant
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reprievds and pardons.

The constitutional outline of the

powers and duties of the Presidency, though more complete
than noted here, does not flesh out the full importance of
the office, but this is so universally recognized that we
do not pause to emphasize it..
'he singular importance of the Presidency, in

comparison with all other offices, is further demonstrated
by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Sections 3 and 4.

The pro-

blem, as we have noted, is one of the functioning of a
'branch -of government, and it is noteworthy that the President
is the only officer of government for whose temporary disability the Constitution provides procedures to qualify, a
replacement.

This is recognition that the President is the

only officer whose temporary disability while in office
incapacitates an entire branch of government.

The Constitu-

tion makes no provision, because none is needed, for such
disability of a Vice President, a judge, a legislator, or
any subordinate .executive branch officer.
3.

Without in any way denigrating the constitutional
I

functions of a Vice President -

or those of any individual

Supreme Court Justice or Senator, for that matter --

they

are clearly less crucial to the operations of the executive
- branch of government than are the functions of a President.
* Although the off

f the Vice Presidency is of co,-se a high

one, it is not indispensable to the orderly operation of
government.

There have been many occasions in our history

when the nation lacked a Vice President, and yet suffered no
ill

consequences.

and, as has been discussed above (page 12,

supra), at least one Vice President successfully fulfilled
the responsibilities of his office while under indictment
In -two states.

There is in fact. no comparison between the

importance, of the Presidency and the Vice Presidency.
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A Vice Xresident has only three constitutional

functions:

(1) to xeplace the President in the event of

the President's removal from office, or his death, resignation, or inability to dis6barge the powers and duties
of his office JTwenty-Fifth Imndment, Sections 4 3, and
4); (2) to make, together with a najority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or such
other body as Congress may by law provide, a written
declaration of the President's inability (Twenty-Fifth
-Amendment. Sectiln -3) ; -a,

13) to preslte vver the Senate,

which Vice Presidents rarely do, and cast the deciding vote
in case of a tie (Article 1, Section 3).!/
none of a Vice President's consitutional functions
is substantially impaired by his liability to the criminal
process.-

/

The only problem that night arise would be the

death of a President at the time a Vice President was the
defendant in a criminal trial.!
tical difficulty, however.

2

That would pose no prac-

The criminal proceedings could

be suspended or terminated and the impeachment process begun.
This would leave the nation in the same practical situation

!/

The Framers assumed that Vice Presidents would not
regularly preside over the Senate, for they expressly provided in Article I, Section 3, Clause 5 for the election
of a President pro tempore to act in the Vice President's
absence.

'*/ Counsel for the Vice President stresses the importance
o the Vice President's role, under the Twenty-Fifth

Amendment, with respect to a declaration of Prdsidential
inability. But that responsibility Is mot an active, continuous executive function. It is, to the contrary, a
responsibility - never yet exercised -- that entails only
a single act, one that could be performed by a Vice President
who was, for example, under indictment. Moreover, It is a
nesponsibility that is shared with a majority of the Cabinet
m-mbers, who are themselves zubject to the criminal process.
O**/We assume, for reasons stated above (p. 13, supra), that
vction and imprisonment of a Vice President, or any civil
crTicer, -would lead'to prompt removal through impeachment.
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as would the institution of impeachment proceedings against
an incumbent President, the sole legal difference being.
that the successor to office would be the Speaker of the
House of Representatives rather than the Vice President.
B.

The Functions of the President are not only
Indispensable to the Operation of Government,
They are Inconsistent with His Subjection to
he criminal Process; There is no Similar
Inconsistency in the Case of a Vice President.

-

Tlie inference that only the President is immune

from indictment and trial prior to removal from office also
arises from an examination of other structural features of
the Constitution.

The Framers could not have contemplated

prosecution of an incumbent President because they vested in
him complete power over the execution of the laws, which
includes, of course, the power to control prosecutions
(Article I, Section 3).

And they gave him "Power to grant

Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment" (Article I,

Section 2, Clause

1), a power that is consistent only with the conclusion that
the President must be removed by impeachment, and so deprived of
the power to pardon, before criminal process can be i±stituted
against him.

A Vice President, of course, has no power either,

to control prosecutions or to grant pardons.

The functions

of the Vice Presidency are thfis not at all inconsistent with
the conclusion that an incumbent may be prosecuted and convicted while still in office.
C.

Basic Considerations of Law Enforcement Militate
'ast
Extension of Immunity to officers other
than the President.

Thus we conclude that considerations derived from
the structure of the Constitution itself indicate that only
a President possesses immunity from the criminal process prior
to impeachment. 'The position of-a Vice President would appear
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to be similar to that of judges, Congressmen, and other
civil officers.

There are also, however, practical consi-

derations that point in the same direction.

Such consider-

ations are entitled to weight in the absence of compelling
constitutional reasons for an immunity of the sort we have
shown exist only for the Presidency.

!n many cases, for

instance, problems will be posed by the presence of coconspirators and the running of the statute of limitations.
An official may have co-conspirators and even if
the officer were immune, his co-conspiratori would not be.'
The result would be that the gar d andatit .uri

JAould

receive evidence about the illegal transactions and that
evidence would inevitably name the officer.

The trial

might end in the conviction of the co-conspirators for
their dealings with the officer, yet the officer would not
be on trial, would not have the opportunity to cross-examine
and present testimony on his own behalf.

The man and his

office would be slandered and demeaned without a trial in
which he was heard.

The individual might prefer that to the

risk of punishment, but the courts should not adopt a rule
that opens the office to such a damaging procedure.

I

This practical problem is raised by the motion
here which asks this Court to prohibit "the Grand

ury from

conducting any investigation looking to the [Vice President's]
possible indictment* and to enjoin the prosecutors from presenting any evidence to the grand jury 'looking to [his]
possible indictment" (Motion, p. 1).
The criminal investigation being conducted by the
grand jury is wide-ranging, and the Vice President is not
its sole subject.

The evidence being presented, while it

touches on the Vice President, involves others also.
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would be virtually impossible to exclude all

evidenge

relating to the Vice President and at the same time present

meaningful evidence relating to possible co-conspirators.
Mus, exx'oining the investigation and presentation of evidance "looking to the possible iLndictment of [the Vice
President]" would require thd investigations of other
persons also to be sdspended.

The relief therefore would

plainly "frustrate the public's interest in the fair and
expeditious administration of the. criminal laws"

(United

States v. Dionisio, supra, 410 U.S. at 17).
The statute of limitations with respect to some
of the possible illegal activiites being investigated will
run as early as October 26, 1973. A suspension of the grand
jury's investigation of the Vice President and others could
therefore jeopardize the possiblity of a timely indictment.
Should this Court suspend the grand juiy investigation the
result would likely be to accord the Vice President and
other persons permanent immunity from prosecution through
the running of the statute of limitations even though it is
unlikely he is entitled even to the temporary immunity, pending conviction upon impeachment, that his counsel claim for
him.

£

CONCLUSION
Nothing we have said-is intended to deprecate in any
way the high office of the Vice .Presidency or its importance
We acknowledge that the issue

in the Constitutional scheme.

raised by counsel for the Vice President is a momentous and
difficult one for any court.

However, in order to assist the

Court in resolving this troublesome question, we have set
forth arguments that counter those advanced by counsel for
the Vice President.
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For the reasons stated, applicant's motions
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General,

KEITH A. JONES,
EDMUND W. XITCH,
Xssstants to the
Solicitor General.
OCTOBER 5, 1973.
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